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caseload fluctuations in selected welfare programmes.  It has been
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This report reviews research on trends in the caseloads of three means-tested transfer
programs in the United States: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the Food Stamp Program (FSP).
Trends in caseloads are the result of 1) program parameters and interactions between
programs, 2) economic conditions, 3) norms and values, and 4) demographic
characteristics.  Most research tries to estimate the relative importance of the first two.
The research suggests that all else equal, as welfare programs become more
generous and easier to get caseloads increase.  Caseload changes are also greatest
when two or more of these four factors provide similar incentives for people to alter
their behavior.  For example, recent declines in AFDC and the FSP caseloads appear
to be the result of the combined effect of the strong U.S. economy and policy changes
that made work more available and more attractive compared to welfare.  Similarly,
program interactions are important.  When programs provide opposing incentives, they
reduce the behavioral response to either incentive, and when programs provide similar
incentives, the behavioral response is greater than if only one program provided the
incentive.  Finally, incentives do not affect everyone in the same way.  Program
changes that benefit some recipients may hurt others.
The research on caseloads has many limitations that reduce confidence in these
estimated effects.  The research is almost all based on reduced-form models, which tell
us little about the causal mechanisms through which exogenous factors affect
caseloads.  The theory about these causal mechanisms is weak resulting in the
possibility of mis-specification and many key variables are poorly measured or omitted.
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This report reviews research on the causes of fluctuations in the caseloads of the two
main means-tested income transfer programs in the United States, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  It also reviews research
that tries to account for the decline in welfare caseloads after 1996 when AFDC was replaced
with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  Finally, it reviews research on trends in
the Food Stamp Program (FSP) caseloads.  The FSP is often referred to as a “near-cash”
assistance program because the benefits, which come in the form of coupons that can be used to
purchase food, are nearly fungible with cash.
The United States social welfare programs are based on a philosophy that is pro-market
and pro-growth, and opposed to large social welfare expenditures.  The three means-tested
programs covered in this Review accounted for .9 percent of GDP in 1996. All means-tested
benefits together account for less than 4 percent of GDP.
Trends in caseloads are the result of four major exogenous factors: 1) program
parameters and interactions with other programs, 2) economic conditions, 3) norms and values,
and 4) demographic characteristics.  Most research on caseloads tries to estimate the relative
importance of the first two on caseloads.  Labor market work, marriage, fertility, and other
endogenous behaviors of individual affect their eligibility for welfare programs. AFDC and food
stamps reduce the work effort of single mothers, but the size of the reduction is small.  In fact it
is probably too small to affect caseloads.  AFDC also modestly increases single parenthood.  The
take-up rate among individuals eligible for programs is also an important determinant of
caseloads.
The research on caseloads has many limitations.  It is almost all based on reduced-form
models, which tell us little about the causal mechanisms through which exogenous factors affect
caseloads.  The theory about these causal mechanisms is weak resulting in the possibility of mis-
specification and many key variables are poorly measured or omitted. 
Even given these limitations some conclusions can be drawn.  All else equal as welfare
programs become more generous the caseload grows.  Caseload changes are greatest when two
or more of the four exogenous factors provide similar incentives for people to alter their
behavior. For example, recent declines in AFDC and the FSP caseloads appear to be the result of
the combined effect of the strong economy and policy changes that made work both more
available and more attractive. Similarly, program interactions are important.  When programs
provide opposing incentives they reduce the response to either incentive, and when incentives
structures are similar, the behavioral response is greater.  Finally, incentives do not affect
everyone in the same way.  Program changes that benefit some recipients may hurt others.Why Welfare Caseloads Fluctuate:
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Why Welfare Caseloads Fluctuate:
A Review of Research on AFDC, SSI, and the Food Stamps Program
Susan E. Mayer
University of Chicago
This report reviews research on the causes of fluctuations in the caseloads of the two
main means-tested income transfer programs in the United States, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  It also reviews research
that tries to account for the decline in welfare caseloads after 1996 when AFDC was replaced
with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  Finally, it reviews research on
trends in the Food Stamp Program (FSP) caseloads.  The FSP is often referred to as a “near-
cash” assistance program because the benefits, which come in the form of coupons that can be
used to purchase food, are nearly fungible with cash.
This Report is divided into six sections.  The first section provides background on the
history of welfare state programs in the United States with special emphasis on the three
programs that are the focus of this review.  The second section provides background on social
science theories of welfare participation.  The next three sections review the research on trends in
caseloads in each of the three programs.  The final section provides tentative methodological and
policy conclusions that can be drawn from this research.
I.  Background on American Welfare State Programs
As is the case with all welfare states, the United States relies on both “benefit programs”
and “non-benefit programs” to help the poor. By a benefit program I mean a program that
transfers income or goods and services directly to individuals or families.  Americans are
perhaps more suspicious of the efficacy of income transfer programs, so they have relied heavily
on non-benefit programs to help the poor.  A major premise of the American welfare state is that
a free labor market is the first and best defense against poverty, and that fostering equal
opportunity in education and employment will maximize both economic growth and economic2
well-being for individual families. Thus many non-benefit programs are intended to foster equal
opportunity and a free labor market and to thereby disproportionately benefit the poor.
Non-benefit policies try to redistribute resources without spending much federal
government money, so they are sometimes called “unfunded mandates.”  Some of these
unfunded mandates are aimed at employers.  For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
established a national minimum wage, the Wagner Act also passed as part of the New Deal
guaranteed workers the right to bargain collectively, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act tried to
prevent discrimination in employment and government funded services.  Other non-benefit
policies limit the kinds of workers an employer can hire.  Child labor laws are one example.
Restrictions on immigration are a more important current example.
Although non-benefit programs have had an important effect on the poor, in this section I
discuss only benefit programs.  I first present a very brief history of America’s major social
welfare programs with an emphasis on the three programs that are the topic of this review.
1 I
then turn to some historical data on caseloads and expenditures on these three programs.  This is
not intended to provide a comprehensive history of social welfare programs in the United States
but only to provide the context for the review of the empirical research on caseload trends.
Before turning to the history of social welfare programs, it is useful to address two issues
related to income in the United States.  The first issue is how to interpret the levels of income
that I describe throughout the Report.  The second is how income is adjusted for changes in
prices.  This is important because I often describe trends in expenditures or benefits in constant
dollars for ease of interpretation.  Table 1 shows a variety of income statistics for the United
States in 1996.  I show income amounts for 1996 because this is the latest year for which much
of the income data is available.  Table 1 shows that the median household income in 1996 was
$35,492 and the official poverty line for a family of three was $12,273.
Throughout this Report I try to express dollar amounts in constant 1996 or 1997
purchasing power.  To do this I need to adjust dollar amounts for changes in prices.  In most
cases I use the Consumer Price Index for urban consumers (CPI-U).  The Census Bureau uses the
CPI-U to adjust the poverty thresholds and other income measures for inflation.  Recent reviews
                                                
1 The background in this section is necessarily incomplete.  Interested readers are referred to Blank (1997), Trattner
(1989), Danziger and Weinberg (1994), Katz (1986, 1989) and many other sources for more in depth overviews of
the American system of social welfare policies.  Detailed descriptions of most programs described in this Report can
be found in the U.S. House of Representatives for various year.3
suggest that the CPI-U over-states inflation.
2  Alternative price indices are available, but these
suffer from problems as well.  Different price indices can yield very different estimates of
changes in prices over time, but in all cases the CPI-U yields the greatest growth in prices.  For
example, the average annual change in prices in the 1970s ranges from 7.1 percent using the
CPI-U to 5.2 percent using what is known as the Personal Consumption Expenditure index.  In
the 1980s the change was 5.5 percent using the CPI, and 5.2 percent using the PCE.  Because the
CPI-U over-states inflation it over-states the decline in welfare benefits over time and under-
states the increase in program expenditures.  I note when I use a price index other than the CPI.
Throughout this Report I refer to several large national data sets that have been used for
most of the research related to welfare caseloads.  These are briefly described in Appendix 1.
A.  Brief History of Major Welfare State Programs
3
America’s major social welfare programs were primarily implemented in three historical
periods: the New Deal of the 1930s, the war on poverty programs of the 1960s, and the “second”
war on poverty in the early 1970s.  By the middle of the 1970s all the major social welfare
programs had been enacted.  During the 1980s Congress made some important changes to these
programs, including some, such as the 1988 Family Support Act, that were precursors of the
major changes to means-tested welfare programs that occurred in 1996.
Table 2 lists the major social welfare programs in the United States and how much the
federal government spent on each in 1996.  This table omits many smaller programs and does not
                                                                                                                                                            
2  Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index (1996), Peterson (1994). The Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) eliminated the CPI's best known defect in 1983, when it stopped using changes in the purchase price of
residential homes to estimate changes in the cost of living in such a home.  But BLS never made this change
retroactive, so the CPI-U still overstates the increase in housing costs prior to 1983.  BLS does provide an alternative
measure, the CPI-U-X1, which indicates what would have happened to the CPI-U if the 1983 change had been made
retroactive to 1967.  The CPI-U-X1 still has all the other problems of the current CPI-U.  The way BLS picks the
goods and services whose price it tracked also inflates the CPI.  Unmeasured changes in the quality of rental
housing, in contrast, produced a downward bias in the pre-1988 CPI and PCE. Like any fixed-weight index, the CPI
understates the speed with which consumers reduce their purchases of things whose relative price has risen
unusually fast.  This substitution bias inflates the CPI by an average of at least 0.2 percent per year (Peterson, 1994)
and perhaps as much as 0.5 percent (Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index, 1995).
3 Much of this brief history of U.S. social welfare programs draws heavily on work that I am doing jointly with
Christopher Jencks for a book manuscript titled, Did We Lose the War on Poverty.  I acknowledge Jencks for his
contribution to that book and hence to this section of the Report.4
included state expenditures.
4  As I discuss below states provide a significant proportion of
expenditures for some of these programs.  Table 2 shows that federal expenditures on the three
programs that are the focus of this report amounted to $66.1 billion, which was .9 percent of
Gross Domestic Product in that year.
5  As I discuss below, states contribute a large proportion of
expenditures for many of these programs.
I now turn to a discussion of the evolution of these programs.
A.1 New Deal.  Franklin Roosevelt arrived in the White House in 1933 in the aftermath
of the Great Depression. Up to this time there had been little government help for the poor, and
what there was was mainly provided by states or counties.  But the Depression left staggering
numbers of Americans destitute.  The main goal of Roosevelt’s New Deal was to revive the
economy and put everyone back to work.  Some northern liberals wanted to do more.  For them,
the ultimate goal was to ensure that the benefits of economic recovery were more equitably
distributed than they had been before the stock market crash of 1929.
      Their efforts led to several major pieces of legislation that left a mark on low-income
Americans.  For the non-working poor, the key piece of legislation was the Social Security Act
of 1935.  The Social Security Act was designed to help individuals whom legislators did not
want to work.  To help such people, it created two kinds of federal cash assistance: social
insurance, which was not means-tested and public assistance, which was.  Social insurance now
takes three forms: retirement benefits for the elderly (“social security”), benefits for the
permanently disabled, and short-term unemployment insurance for individuals who have lost
their job and are looking for another one.  These programs are financed by payroll taxes, and
benefits are limited to individuals whose employer has contributed to the system.  High-wage
workers also get more generous benefits than low-wage workers, although low-wage workers get
a higher return on their contributions.
As Table 2 shows retirement benefits for the elderly are by far the largest component of
this system and they have probably done more to reduce poverty in the United States than any
                                                
4 The federal government has dozens of social welfare programs.  In Table 2 I have included programs with annual
federal expenditures of at least $3.5 billion.  However, if it is not always clear what a “program” is.  One might
consider all child nutrition programs separately or group them together as one program.  If one groups programs
there is always a debate about what should be grouped with what.  For the purposes of this table I did not group
programs together.
5 U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, page 1355.5
other federal program.  Most of the benefits go to people with incomes well above the poverty
line, few Americans thinks of social security as an anti-poverty program even though social
security benefits are redistributive.
Unlike social insurance, public assistance benefits are financed by general tax revenues.
Benefits depend on individuals' current need, not their past earnings.  Until 1969, the largest
public assistance program was Old Age Assistance (OAA).  OAA was designed for people who
did not qualify for social security, either because they had retired before the Act was passed or
because they had worked in an uncovered industry.  Benefits were uniformly low, but they made
a big difference to millions of old people.
 Aid to Dependent Children (later changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
or AFDC) was public assistance for single mothers and their children. It replaced the "mothers'
pensions" that some states had established early in the century.  Like other forms of public
assistance, ADC was originally run by the states.  During the 1940s and 1950s most states treated
ADC as a form of publicly financed charity and they gave local case workers considerable
discretion about giving or with-holding benefits.  Washington's main role was to pay part of the
bills.
In 1937 the federal government began making grants to local housing authorities for
public housing.  The idea was that Washington would finance construction costs and the local
authorities would then operate the projects, using their rental income to pay for maintenance.
Because rents were limited to 25 percent of income (30 percent after 1981), many local
authorities were reluctant to admit very poor tenants, since these tenants could not pay enough to
support their share of the building's maintenance. Those projects that did admit very poor tenants
had trouble attracting more affluent tenants.  As a result, they were often badly maintained and
quite dangerous.  Because local authorities managed public housing, the recipients of this varied
greatly not only across states but also across cities in states.
Until the 1960s these programs formed America’s welfare state effort.
A.2 The First War on Poverty. The war on poverty initiated by Lyndon Johnson in
1964, added three enduring legacies to America’s social welfare programs: compensatory
education, subsidies for needy college students, and Medicaid.6
Lyndon Johnson first outlined his plans for a war on poverty in the Economic Report that
he sent to Congress in January, 1964.
6  Drafted by his Council of Economic Advisors, this report
outlined a strategy that reflected the thinking of most liberal economists at the time.  It also
represented a sharp break with the New Deal approach, which had limited itself to making
modest cash payments to the very poor and leaving the states with a lot of discretion in their
efforts to help the poor.  Johnson's approach was more ambitious.  The key to reducing poverty,
his report argued, was "building individual earning power."  To achieve this goal the federal
government should do five things: improve poor children's schooling, make health care more
accessible to the poor, help poor adults acquire more skills, rehabilitate economically depressed
communities, and eliminate racial discrimination.
This list reflected economists' growing belief that what they were beginning to call
"investment in human capital" was the key to both economic growth and a more equal
distribution of income. The report did recognize that skill enhancement could never be expected
to eliminate all poverty.  It therefore alluded briefly to a second strategy for reducing poverty,
which was to "protect individuals and their families from poverty when their own earnings are
insufficient because of age, disability, unemployment, or other family circumstances."  But
Johnson's proposals for helping such people were cautious.  He did not ask for any increase in
cash benefits for the elderly, the disabled, or single parents.
Johnson, following Roosevelt, believed that handouts had a corrosive effect on the poor.
This made cash aid for able-bodied men out of the question and cash aid for single mothers a
necessary evil.  ADC had been established because it was cheaper than alternative ways to
support destitute children such as foster care and orphanages.  Denying benefits to unwed
mothers would have forced states to spend more on such alternatives.  In addition, by the 1950s a
growing number of politicians began to complain that ADC encouraged single parenthood.
Thus, Johnson had no inclinations to be more generous with single parents. His only important
proposal for helping the non-working poor was that Washington should underwrite health care
for the elderly.
Originally AFDC was available only to families with children and only one able-bodied
adult, almost always the mother and almost always a widow.
7  Beginning in 1961 states had the
                                                
6 See Council of Economic Advisors,  1964.7
option to provide benefits to families with two parents when the parents were unemployed. This
option is know as the AFDC-UP (for “unemployed parent” program).  The program for single
parents is known as the AFDC-Basic program. About half of states did operate AFDC-UP
programs.
In the South, where black mothers had always been expected to work, whites criticized
ADC for discouraging black women from taking jobs in agriculture or as domestic workers.  As
more white mothers moved into the paid labor force, Northern legislators began echoing this
complaint.  Congress passed the first legislation aimed at putting welfare mothers to work in
1967, and it pursued this goal unsuccessfully throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
  In the 1940s and 1950s, a mother's need for public assistance was often seen as prima
facia evidence of her incompetence, and most states employed case workers to help recipients
manage their lives better.  Case workers routinely made home visits, partly to check on whether
the recipient was living with a man but also to see whether the children were getting a nutritious
diet, the house was kept clean, and so on.  But case workers had a lot of discretion.  They could
deny benefits to women who they suspected of “immoral” behavior or poor parenting practices.
During the 1960s the Supreme Court outlawed the “man in the house” rule, which had
allowed social workers to make unannounced visits to recipients’ homes to search for signs that a
man might be living there. The Court also over-turned rules requiring families to reside in a state
for a specified period of time before becoming eligible for benefits.  Many states had different
work rules for black and white recipients and these were also over-turned.  The courts also
required due process for families denied benefits. These decisions greatly expanded the number
of families, especially black families, eligible for AFDC benefits.
8
Congress passed the bill authorizing Medicaid in 1965.  It funded up to 85 percent of a
state's cost for providing medical care to low-income individuals who were blind, disabled, aged
and members of poor families with children.  Medicaid is by far the largest government program
                                                                                                                                                            
7 U.S. House of Representatives, 1993, provides a legislative history of AFDC.
8 These lawsuits were brought by welfare rights groups partly because the federal government was paying a greater
share of expenditures on AFDC and therefore could reasonably be expected to enforce a stronger set of rules.  The
Social Security Act had required the federal government to pay only a third of the costs associated with ADC.  In
1956 variable matching rates were enacted to allow the federal government to pay more in states with lower per
capita income.  It was not until 1965 that the federal government could match state expenditures on AFDC (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1998, page 405).8
providing medical care to the poor with outlays of $92 billion in 1996.  The Veterans
Administration (VA) also provides free medical care for low-income veterans, even if their
disabilities are not related to their military service.  Prior to the establishment of Medicaid, most
states also had some system for covering public assistance recipients' hospital bills and many
hospitals and physicians provided uncompensated care to the poor.
      When the Johnson Administration was trying to devise a strategy for improving poor
people's job skills, the existing educational system was widely seen as having two major
problems.  At the elementary and secondary levels, poor children mostly attended school, but
they learned less than their more affluent classmates.  At the post-secondary level, students from
poor families seldom enrolled at all.  Most reformers believed that money could help solve both
these problems.  At the elementary and secondary level, the idea was to equalize the amount
spent on schools serving rich and poor children.  At the post-secondary level the goal was to
provide scholarships and loans to students from low-income families, so that they could compete
on equal terms with students whose families were paying their college bills.
      Title 1 (later Chapter 1) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided federal
money to schools with high proportions of low-income children.  This money was supposed to
be used for programs that helped students with learning problems catch up with their classmates.
In the same spirit, the Johnson Administration created Head Start to ensure that poor children
whose home environment did not prepare them for school would nonetheless start kindergarten
as well prepared as anyone else.  Head Start provides a wide range of services primarily to low-
income pre-school children and their families.  Its goal is to improve the cognitive skills, social
skills, health, and nutrition of such children.  Most participants in Head Start attend a half-day of
pre-school three to five days a week.
Federal guidelines about how Chapter 1 money is to be spent have always been very
broad ensuring that school districts and even individual schools use the money in very different
ways and with varying degrees of success.  Head Start, though politically popular, has never
been fully funded, so a relatively small share of poor children participate.  In 1996 less than a
third of income-eligible children were enrolled in Head Start.
At the other end of the pipeline were a few programs, like Upward Bound, that were
supposed to increase the proportion of poor high school students who attended college.  But the
most important programs, at least in terms of cost, were those providing grants and subsidized9
loans to needy college students.  For those who did not attend college, the Economic Opportunity
Act established a variety of job training programs for the poor, such as the Job Corps and later
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).
A.3 The Second War on Poverty.  The third era of major new anti-poverty legislation
was 1970-1976.  During this period a series of struggles between Presidents Richard Nixon,
Gerald Ford and Congress, added four more major programs: the FSP, SSI, Section 8 housing,
and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
Because AFDC was an "entitlement" available to any family that met the program's
eligibility standards its cost depended partly on the number of poor single parent families.  The
proportion of children living in single parent families had risen steadily since 1960 (see below).
Between 1960 and 1975 the proportion of single parents collecting AFDC also rose sharply,
going from under 30 percent in the early 1960s to around 60 percent in the mid-1970s.
Participation in AFDC rose among single mothers partly because of the Supreme Court rulings
that increased eligibility for AFDC and partly because benefits became more generous. Because
of these trends the number of AFDC recipients and public spending on means-tested transfers
increased rapidly.
Many legislators were disturbed by the growth of AFDC and suspected that it had
actually caused some of the increase in single parenthood.  At the same time race riots in major
American cities focused attention on slums and “urban blight.”  Nixon disliked the patchwork of
programs created and expanded by Johnson’s war on poverty.   In addition, enthusiasm for the
“human capital” approach to reducing poverty was tempered by a series of influential studies that
seemed to show that "throwing money at the problem" would not help disadvantaged students
learn more.  In 1966 the Coleman Report showed that student achievement was far more strongly
linked to their family background than to the resources available in their schools.  Another major
study had found that while Head Start produced modest short-term increases in disadvantaged
children's IQ scores, these gains were not sustained once the children entered the public schools.
9
Other studies raised serious doubts about whether compensatory education was raising
elementary school students' reading scores.
10  While all this research had flaws, even those who
                                                
9 See Westinghouse Learning Corporation/Ohio University, 1969.
10 See John W. McDavid (1969) and Harry Picciarello (1969).10
remained committed to the "human capital" strategy had to admit that it would not pay off for
years.  After five years of racial turmoil and growing welfare rolls, few politicians felt they could
afford to wait that long.
Most, including Nixon, wanted an anti-poverty strategy that would produce more
immediate benefits.  Nixon proposed a Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which was a national
negative income-tax that would have federalized the costs of public assistance and extended
benefits to some working people who had not previously been covered.  Congressional
Democrats were unenthusiastic about FAP.  Welfare activists mostly opposed the program
because it would have made a few of the non-working poor worse off.  Conservative
Republicans were also hostile to FAP, because they knew it would cost money and feared it
would discourage work.  After several years of debate, the plan died in 1972.
Having defeated FAP, many legislators still wanted to do more for the "deserving" poor,
notably the aged, blind, and disabled.  They therefore enacted Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) in 1972 and began implementing it in 1975.  SSI provides cash assistance to financially
needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Like FAP, SSI set a national minimum
income for everyone in the eligible population, along with national eligibility standards.  Unlike
AFDC, SSI benefits were indexed to inflation. Disability is defined as a mental or physical
impairment so severe that it prevents the individual from doing any work.
The enactment of SSI did not imply any basic shift in the way Americans thought about
poverty.  It still provided a minimum income to individuals who were not expected to work.
However, a more fundamental change in the way Congress thought about poverty also began at
around this time. This was the expansion of means-tested non-cash benefits.
  The federal government ran a tiny food stamp program during the 1960s and the Food
Stamp Act of 1964 authorized the federal government to provide coupons for the purchase of
food to low income individuals and families.  But the FSP did not become important until 1972,
when FAP went down to defeat.  At that point Congress turned the FSP into a kind of guaranteed
annual income indexed to inflation.  Every low-income family was eligible, and benefits were
the same throughout the continental United States.
11  Food stamp benefits and rules became
nationally uniform in 1974.  Since then food stamp benefits have been adjusted for changes in
food prices, first semi-annually then eventually annually with a few exceptions.
                                                
11 See Trippe et al. 1992 for an excellent summary of the legislative history of the Food Stamp Program.11
Between 1974, when it became a nation-wide program, and 1981 several administrative
changes made food stamps easier to get.  One important change was that determination of
eligibility for AFDC and food stamps was consolidated so that both could be done in AFDC
offices.  A second important change was that prior to 1977 recipients had to purchase food stamp
coupons for a portion of their face-value.  Since 1977 the federal government has paid the full
costs of food stamps.
By the end of the 1960s public housing had acquired such a bad reputation that Congress
began looking for alternatives.  Starting in 1974, Section 8 of the Housing Act began providing
rent subsidies for low-income tenants in privately owned housing.  Section 8 makes up the
difference between a private unit's market rent (not to exceed the “fair market rent” for a given
housing market as established by the federal government) and the tenant's federally mandated
share, which is currently 30 percent of the household's total income. Today the bulk of public
spending on low-income housing is for rent subsidies for private rental units.  Public housing is
relatively rare even for very poor families.  In 1995 only 8 percent of AFDC recipients lived in
public housing, and most did not live in the high rise public housing projects than have become
notorious for their crime and gangs.
      The three main non-cash programs - Medicaid, food stamps and housing subsidies - have
recently proven more politically resilient than AFDC for two reasons.
12  First, they reassure
skeptical taxpayers that the money is mostly going for things they favor, like better food,
housing, and medical care, and not for things they oppose, like drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and
fancy clothes.  Second, by focussing on food, housing, and medical care, these non-cash
programs help mobilize support from prospective providers.  Hospitals fight for Medicaid,
because otherwise their bills for uncompensated care would be higher.  Farm state
representatives support food stamps, on the (somewhat problematic) grounds that they drive up
food consumption.  Builders favor some forms of low-income housing, because they can make
money creating it.
      The last major addition to the American welfare state was the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC, or as it now sometimes called the Earned Income Credit or EIC).  It was enacted in 1975,
dramatically expanded in 1986 and 1994 after which it continued to be expanded.
13  The EITC is
                                                
13 For a history of the EITC see Ventry, 1999.12
a wage subsidy for low-wage workers received as a credit when paying taxes. The EITC is a
refundable tax credit, which means that families whose earnings are so low that they do not have
to pay any federal taxes can still receive the credit as a direct payment from the Treasury.
A.4 The 1980s.  By the end of the 1970s the major programs of the American welfare
state were in place.  But there were important changes to those programs in the 1980s and 1990s
that affected program caseloads.  The major changes were to Medicaid and AFDC.
Ronald Reagan came to office on a political platform that emphasized reducing the
federal budget and the role of the federal government in the lives of the American people.
Reagan had no particular vision for welfare reform.  His reforms were mainly motivated by a
desire to reduce spending.
In 1981 Congress passed an Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.  It reduced the number
of families eligible for AFDC by lowering the income at which families were eligible.  Prior to
the 1981 OBRA, federal law required states to deduct $30 in work expenses plus an additional
third of earned income when determining eligibility and benefit levels for AFDC.  This was
known as the “30-and-a-third rule.”  The 1981 OBRA restricted the 30-and-a-third rule to four
months, after which all earnings and costs of work were counted against AFDC benefit levels.
This in effect raised the tax on earnings for AFDC recipients and lowered the income at which
they were eligible for benefits.  For example, prior to implementation of the 1981 OBRA, if a
woman earned $300 in a month, $30.00 plus $100 (a third of $300) was deducted before her
eligibility and AFDC benefits were determined.  So her countable income was $170.  After the
1981 OBRA, once this woman had been on AFDC for four months all $300 of her earnings
counted against her eligibility and benefit level.  If the income cut-off in a state was $200 per
month, a woman earning $300 qualified before the 1981 OBRA was implemented.  This was
lowered to $200 after the 1981 OBRA.  Some of these changes were reversed in 1984 when the
30-and-a-third rule was extended to apply for a year.
The 1981 OBRA also slowed the increase in food stamp benefits by delaying cost of living
increases and making some groups (such as strikers and college students) ineligible for food
stamps altogether.  Congress liberalized food stamp eligibility in 1985, easing limits on assets
and several forms of cash assistance and removing address requirements that had prevented the
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homeless from getting food stamps.  The Hunger Prevention Act of 1988 increased food stamp
benefits across the board.
 Recipients of AFDC and now TANF have always been categorically eligible for
Medicaid.  But when families left AFDC either because the mother went to work or because she
married, the family lost public health insurance coverage.  These were often not replaced with
private health insurance because welfare recipients usually have to take low-paying jobs with
few employer-provided benefits.  Some states had an optional Medicaid program called the
“Medically Needy” program.  In these states some families who were not eligible for AFDC but
who had high medical expenses could get Medicaid.  But this did not apply to families whose
members were in relatively good health.   Many people thought that the connection between
Medicaid and AFDC discouraged single mothers from working and that this disincentive was
growing more important as the cost of health care increased.  Several reforms to Medicaid were
designed to loosen the connection between Medicaid and AFDC.
In 1986 Congress extended Medicaid coverage to pregnant women and children under six
years old whose family income was less than 133 percent of the poverty line.  In 1988 Congress
required states to extend Medicaid coverage for up to one year to former AFDC recipients who
became ineligible for AFDC because their earnings from work increased.  In 1991 Congress
extended Medicaid to cover all poor children born after 1983.  As a result of these changes, two-
thirds of children living below the poverty line received Medicaid in 1991 compared to only half
in 1987, even though the 1991 changes in eligibility were probably not fully implemented in that
year.
14
Several legislative changes in the 1980s dramatically cut appropriations for new spending
on federal housing assistance.  However, because housing commitments are generally long-term,
the number of families receiving housing assistance continued to increase.  Expenditures on
housing for poor families also increased rapidly in the 1980s due to both an increase in the
number of households receiving housing subsidies and an increase in the subsidy per household.
The total number of households receiving federal rental assistance increased from 2.9 million in
                                                
14  The number of children covered by Medicaid in 1991 comes from U.S. House of Representatives, 1993, page
1639.  The number for 1987 is from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, table 148.14
1980 to 4.5 million in 1990. The government outlay per unit increased from $3,480 in 1980 to
$4,480 in 1996 (in constant dollars).
15
In 1988 Congress passed the Family Support Act.  It was the first step towards the
dramatic 1996 revision of welfare.  The Family Support Act was partly a response to the growing
consensus that single mothers should be self-sufficient. Congress required all states to operate
work placement programs for AFDC recipients who were “work-eligible.” These programs were
called Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs and they replaced earlier work
programs including the work incentive (WIN) program.  Congress provided matching funds to
states to operate such programs.  Women whose children were younger than three years or who
had disabilities were not considered work eligible.
States had considerable flexibility in the kinds of JOBS programs that they ran.  For
example, in 1995 the share of the state’s JOBS participants in post-secondary education ranged
from .3 percent to 38.0 percent.  The share of JOBS participants in Community Work Experience
Programs (a public works program) ranged from zero percent in one state to 30 percent in several
states.  Most states operated minimal programs and most participants received little more than
help in searching for jobs.  Nationwide in 1995 only 26.8 percent of AFDC adults who were
required to participate in JOBS programs actually participated.
16
The Family Support Act also required that beginning in October 1990 all states offer
AFDC-UP.
17  The AFDC-UP program remained a small part of the overall AFDC program.   In
1970 only 3 percent of AFDC recipient families nationwide received benefits through AFDC-
UP.  In 1980 3.9 percent received such benefits.  By 1996 only 6.6 percent received AFDC-UP
benefits.  Thus AFDC remained largely a program for single mothers and their children.
Unlike prior federal efforts to get welfare recipients to work, the Family Support Act
required states to provide child care subsidies for mothers who went to work or job training.  It
                                                
15   Data on number of households receiving subsidies is from U.S. House o Representatives, 1998, page 994.  Data
on expenditure per unit is from page 997.
16 Information on JOBS programs comes from U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, pages 472- 489.
17  The Family Support Act required all states to AFDC to children in two-parent families who are needy because of
the unemployment of one parent.  States that did not have an AFDC-UP program prior to September 26, 1988 were
allowed to limit benefits under the AFDC-UP program to as few as six months in a calendar year (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1998, page 603).15
also provided funds to states to provide child care to families not receiving AFDC who need such
care in order to work and would otherwise be at risk of receiving AFDC.
A.5 The Clinton Years.  Clinton came to office on a platform that promised changes in
welfare.  Since 1962 the federal government has had the authority to grant waivers to states that
proposed experimental or pilot programs consistent with the goals of AFDC.  But beginning in
1994 the number of waivers increased dramatically.  By 1996 the Clinton Administration had
granted waivers to forty-three states. The waivers differed dramatically across states, but most
included some combination of time limits on welfare receipt, increased work requirements,
expanded earning disregards in the calculation of eligibility and benefits, and “family caps”
which eliminated the increases in benefits that women had previously gotten when they had an
additional child.
Many of these waivers implemented program parameters that were eventually
incorporated in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act (PRWORA),
which was the most important social welfare legislation of the Clinton Administration.  As part
of this bill AFDC was replaced by a block grant to states called Temporary Assistance to Needy
People (TANF).
18  TANF differs from AFDC in several ways.  It provides states much more
autonomy in implementing their welfare programs.  As with AFDC income limits and benefit
levels are set by the state.  But unlike AFDC TANF is not an entitlement program, so states can
decide themselves what categories of families to make eligible. In addition TANF explicitly
allows states to administer programs through charitable, religious or private organizations.  For
most states TANF has provided substantially more funds than they would have received through
AFDC, because the size of TANF block grants was based on funding levels during previous
years with larger caseloads.
To receive the full block grant states must meet specific targets for having TANF
recipients in work activities and states are required to spend some state funds for this purpose.
TANF requires recipients to be engaged in work activities after a maximum of two years of
benefits.  This requirement is phased in over several years.  States can opt to set shorter time
                                                
18 A block grant is a lump sum of money that goes to states to be used by the state for a very broad set of programs.
States receive other block grants for social welfare services as well.  For example, the Title XX Social Services
Block Grant provides money to states to help them provide services directed at any one or more of five goals.  These
goals are extremely broad: one reads “achieving or maintaining economic self-support to prevent, reduce, or
eliminate dependency.”  It is nearly impossible to summarize or even know how block grant money is spent and I do
not discuss them in this Report.16
frames for recipients to begin working and many states have done so.  TANF sets a five-year
life-time limit on receipt of benefits.  States can exempt up to 20 percent of their base caseload
for reasons of hardship.  States can adopt shorter time limits and many have done so.  These time
limits did not begin to take effect until late in 1998, so almost no research on the effect of these
time limits has been completed.
TANF explicitly forbids the use of federal money to provide benefits to unwed mothers
under the age of eighteen who do not live with an adult relative or other adult supervisor and
unwed mothers under eighteen years who do not have a high school diploma and are not enrolled
in school.  States may also not use federal money to provide benefits to new immigrants until
they have been in the United States for five years.
The welfare reform legislation of 1996 also enacted significant changes to the FSP.
Because of changes in how income is counted and a reduction in the income threshold for the
maximum benefit, food stamp benefits fell from an average of about 80 cents per person per
meal to 75 cents. PRWORA also limited eligibility for food stamps among childless able-bodied
adults to no more than six months in a 36-month period unless the recipient works at least half
time or is enrolled in a work training program.  As part of welfare reform some states have
administratively separated the application process for food stamps from the application process
for TANF, presumably increasing the transaction costs associated with getting food stamps.
PROWRA made most adult legal immigrants ineligible for the FSP.
Although PRWORA was the most important social policy legislation of the Clinton
Administration, it was not the only one. In 1993 the Balanced Budget Act increased funding and
expanded eligibility for Medicaid.  The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) provides
federal funds to states to expand health insurance coverage of uninsured children whose family
income is up to 185 percent of the federal poverty line.
19  The funds can be used to expand
Medicaid eligibility or to create a separate program.  The changes to Medicaid that began with
the 1988 Family Support Act have resulted in a significant number of additional low-income
children receiving government health benefits. Between 1984 and 1995 the number of children
                                                                                                                                                            
19 I do not discuss the official poverty measure or poverty rates in this Review.  Historically few major means-tested
programs were tied in a straightforward way to the poverty line.  The poverty thresholds have been seriously
criticized and academics and policy makers agree that it tells us little about which families or individuals experience
material hardship.  See Citro and Michael 1995 for a critique of the poverty measure and a review of the extensive
research literature on the official U.S. poverty measure.17
covered by Medicaid increased 77 percent and the number of eligible adults with children
increased 36 percent.
20  These expansions primarily affect non-welfare families with incomes
close to the poverty line.  This presumably makes work more attractive because a low-skilled
woman can work without losing her health insurance benefits.
In addition, Congress repeatedly expanded the EITC.  By 1997 the maximum credit for
an earner with one child was $2,210.  A worker with two or more children could get $3,656.  The
maximum credit went to families with earnings between $9,140 and $11,930.  The credit
declines for workers with higher earnings. In 1997 the EITC was completely phased out for
workers with adjusted gross wages of $29,290.  For comparison, the average annual pay for
workers was about $29,000 in 1997.  The median earnings for female full-time year around
workers was $23,172.  The EITC is more popular in Congress than other cash transfer programs
because it appears to encourage work rather than idleness.  The EITC now transfers more cash to
the poor than AFDC did before it was replaced with TANF.
In 1990 the Supreme Court decision in the Sullivan v. Zebley case required the federal
government to revise the definition of disability used to assess children’s eligibility for SSI.
Prior to then to be eligible a child’s disability had to correspond to one of the categories of
disability on the Social Security Administration’s  “listing of impairments.”  In contrast adults
could be declared eligible if either their disability fit one of these listings or if an individual
assessment found a sufficiently limiting condition.  The Supreme Court held that depending only
on the listings for children did not satisfy the intent of the law, which was to gauge whether
children’s impairments were comparable in severity to impairments that would qualify an adult.
The result was that many more children became eligible for SSI through individual assessments.
In 1994 Congress passed a law that again restricted eligibility among disabled children and in
1996 it required all participants to have a disability that is included in the listing of impairments.
At the same time they expanded this list.  Nonetheless, as a result of the 1996 changes many
children were expected to lose their SSI benefits.
                                                                                                                                                            
20 The size of Medicaid caseloads is not always a good indicator of the scope of the Medicaid program.  Many
eligible families do not sign up for Medicaid until a family member is sick.  Clinics and hospitals are very
aggressive about getting eligible patients covered because this assures that their services will be paid for.  Thus
many people do not get Medicaid until they need it.18
Major new social policies were enacted in the 1960s and early 1970s.  In the 1980s and
up to 1996 Congress and the President enacted major changes to the existing programs.  But
throughout both periods and before, America’s approach to social welfare programs has always
been pro-work, pro-growth and pro-low social welfare spending.  Its pro-work stance is
demonstrated by first its unwillingness to provide income support for “able-bodied” Americans
and second by the great concern of policy-makers and the general public with the potential work
disincentives of welfare programs, the rhetoric of human capital investment.  Its pro-growth
approach is demonstrated by the concern that disincentives to work will reduce productivity, that
taxation to pay for social welfare programs will stifle growth, and in general its concern that
interventions in the labor market will reduce productivity.  Finally, its pro-low social welfare
spending is demonstrated by the fact that social welfare spending as a percent of GDP is lower in
the United States than in most other rich nations.
21
Table 3 summarizes some of the major changes in work incentives that occurred during
the 1980s and 1990s.  It shows that when an unmarried mother of two children went from
welfare to a job earning $10,000 in the median state in 1986 she had to pay $894 in taxes
compared to $765 in 1997.  Similarly she lost $5,924 in means-tested benefits in 1986, but only
$4,967 in 1997.  She gained more in the EITC and in child care subsidies in 1997 compared to
1986.  Taking all this into consideration, she would have $6,924 in disposable income in 1997
compared to only $2,107 in 1986.  In addition, her children would remain covered by Medicaid
in 1997 but not in 1986.  The incentives to work increased a lot and at the same time the
economy was very strong.  As we will see the combination of these factors made a decline in
welfare rolls inevitable.
B. The Role of States
The United States has historically relied a great deal on individual states both to provide
their own social welfare programs and to implement federal programs.  An on-going feature of
the American political debate on domestic policies is the extent of state autonomy and an
                                                
21 Cross-country comparisons of social welfare spending are fraught with pitfalls.  Categories of spending as well as
need for spending vary across countries, as does the measure of GDP.  Furthermore differences in spending do not
necessarily result in differences in economic well-being (Mayer,1993).   Nonetheless, few would argue that the
United States is not among the stingiest of nations when it comes to social welfare spending, especially for the non-
elderly.19
important feature of the history of social welfare programs is the extent to which they are funded
and implemented by states or the federal government. The FSP and SSI are both federal
programs with nationally uniform eligibility standards and benefit levels.  In contrast AFDC was
implemented by states. The federal government mandated a set of minimum standards that states
had to adhere to in return for the federal government paying on average about half the cost of
AFDC.  But states had a great deal of latitude in setting eligibility rules and benefit levels.  As a
result eligibility rules and benefit levels varied greatly across states.
In 1996 AFDC benefits were $636 per month for a family of three in the most generous
state (not counting Alaska and Hawaii, which have unusually high benefits and unusually high
costs of living) and only $120 for a family of the same size in the least generous state. (See
below for a discussion of trends in benefits levels.) Some of this difference is attributable to local
variations in the cost of living, but still the purchasing power of AFDC benefits has always
varied considerably across states. As I discuss below, the difference in benefit levels across states
is often used to identify the effect of benefit levels on caseloads or participation in AFDC. TANF
provides even more autonomy to states.
Although SSI is a federal program, forty states currently have their own programs to
augment SSI.  As with AFDC the amount paid through these state programs varies greatly. In
1997 Connecticut paid the highest supplement, $243 per month to an aged individuals living
independently with no other income.  Wyoming paid the lowest supplement of $10 per month.
SSI benefits are much less variable across states than AFDC benefits.  In 1997 maximum SSI
benefit (state and federal) for aged individuals was $640 per month in California and the lowest
was $484 in many states.  For an elderly couple living independently the SSI benefits varied
from a high of $1,254 in California to a low of $726 in many states.
Seven states have their own EITC and of course tax policy including how much poor
families are taxed varies greatly across states.
Because of the reliance on states to provide their own social welfare programs and to
implement with varying degrees of autonomy federal programs, and the complex interactions
among programs the actual welfare benefits available to families can vary greatly across states,
and even across cities and counties within states.  Thus when researchers estimate the effect of
changes in federal spending or welfare parameters on caseloads, it is in the context of all the
local variations in the program.20
C. Interactions Among Programs.
Several types of interactions among social welfare programs could affect caseloads.  The
first kind of program interaction is shared eligibility.  This means that anyone who is eligible for
Program A is automatically income-eligible for Program B.  For example, all families who were
eligible for AFDC (and now TANF) or SSI were also eligible for Medicaid, food stamps, and
several other food and nutrition programs.
22 This means that as eligibility for AFDC increased
eligibility for these other programs also increased. The reverse was not true, that is not everyone
eligible for Medicaid or food stamps was eligible for AFDC. Thus growth in the number of
people eligible for food stamps did not necessarily imply growth in the number of people eligible
for AFDC.
Because of shared eligibility may families receive benefits from multiple programs and
participation in multiple programs has increased somewhat over the last decade.  In 1995 87.2
percent of households receiving AFDC also received food stamps and this number had risen
from 81.4 percent in 1984.
23  Participation in Medicaid among households receiving AFDC
increased from 93.2 percent in 1984 to 97.2 percent in 1995.  In 1995 50.0 percent of households
receiving SSI also received food stamps.  Participation in the FSP among households receiving
SSI had hardly changed from the 46.5 percent FSP benefits in 1984. Recipients of SSI and
AFDC/TANF also usually qualify for housing subsidies.
24  But housing subsidies are not
entitlements.  Thus in 1995 31.1 percent of households receiving AFDC received some kind of
rent subsidy.  But this number had increased from 23.0 percent in 1984.
A second type of program interaction is eligibility exclusion.  This occurs when recipients
of Program A are automatically excluded from Program B.  For example a person receiving SSI
cannot also receive AFDC/TANF.  To the extent that individuals are eligible for both Program A
and Program B, an increase the caseloads of one will result in a decline in the caseloads of the
                                                
22  AFDC recipients are income eligible for the School Lunch Program, the School Breakfast Program and the
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women Infants and Children (U.S. House of Representatives, 1998,
page 407).  Many people who are eligible do not receive these benefits.  For example, some eligible children may
attend schools that do not participate in the School Breakfast or School Lunch Program.
23 See U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, page 922.
24 Throughout the remainder of this Report I will refer to AFDC/TANF when the same factors apply to both.  I will
refer to the programs individually when distinguishing between them.21
other.  It also means that programs compete for some recipients, so if SSI benefits are higher
than AFDC/TANF benefits, individuals who can will switch from participating in AFDC/TANF
to participating in SSI.
Two types of program interactions have to do with how resources are counted in
determining eligibility and benefit levels.  The first is benefit inclusion.  This means that benefits
from Program A are counted as income in determining eligibility or benefit levels for program B.
For example, in the FSP for every additional dollar of income a family receives, its food stamp
benefit is reduced by about 30 cents.  AFDC benefits count as income.  Thus if AFDC benefits
increase food stamp benefits decrease.  This has had two important implications.  First, when
AFDC benefit levels fell in real terms beginning in the early 1970s (benefit levels are discussed
below), food stamps compensated for some of the loss.  Second, in states with low AFDC/TANF
benefits recipients get higher food stamp benefits.  Thus differences across states in the
combined AFDC and food stamp benefit are smaller than the difference in AFDC benefits.  The
highest state AFDC benefit was 5.3 times the benefit in the lowest paying state in 1996.  The
difference for the combined AFDC and food stamp benefits was a factor of only 2 in the same
year.
The second program interaction having to do with how resources are counted is benefit
exclusion.  This happens when Program A disregards the benefits from Program B in
determining eligibility or benefit levels.  For example, income from the EITC could not be
counted as income for determining AFDC benefit levels or eligibility. (States can decide how
TANF treats EITC payments.)   Similarly, a child who receives SSI cannot be counted as part of
an AFDC/TANF unit.  This means that the child’s needs cannot not be taken into account in
determining eligibility or benefit levels.  But the child’s SSI or other income cannot not be
counted as available to the family and therefore cannot not be counted in determining the
eligibility or the benefit level for other family members.
D.  Trends in Expenditures on Means-tested Programs
This section describes trends on expenditures on social welfare programs.  Expenditure
trends are useful for understanding the context of the United States social welfare programs, but
expenditure trends tell us little about caseload trends. Expenditures can increase both because
benefit levels increase or because the number of recipients increase.22
 Total spending on social welfare programs (including social insurance and public
assistance programs) in the United States has increased from 4.4 percent of GNP in 1960 to 12.9
percent in 1992.  In price-adjusted dollars, total spending on such programs increased from $92.8
billion in 1960 to $703.5 billion in 1992.  The trend in total expenditures obscures important
differences among programs.
Figure 1 shows total state and federal expenditures on social welfare programs not
counting education programs.
25   It shows that social security accounts for the greatest amount of
total expenditures with expenditures for medical care a close second.
Figure 2 compares trends in spending on social insurance programs with trends in
spending on means-tested cash and non-cash transfer programs and means-tested education and
training programs.
26  The difference between spending on social insurance programs and
spending on means-tested programs has grown.  This is partly due to the fact that most social
insurance expenditures are tied to inflation, while most means-tested benefits are not.  In addition
the proportion of the population covered by social insurance benefits (mainly the elderly whose
employers paid into the system) increased faster than the proportion of the population covered by
means-tested benefits.  Since the 1960s the rhetoric of social welfare policies in the United States
has been about increasing human capital.  However, we have in fact spent relatively little on
means-tested education and training programs compared to the amount that we have spent on
means-tested cash and non-cash transfer programs.
Figure 3 shows that expenditures for means-tested cash transfers increased steeply from
1960 until 1975 then declined until the mid-1980s when they increased again. Most of the early
increase was due to an increase in expenditures on AFDC.  The growth after 1985 was due
mainly to growth in the EITC and SSI.
Figure 4 shows spending on means-tested non-cash programs. By far the most expensive
non-cash program is Medicaid. Most of the growth in expenditures on non-cash programs is
                                                
25 In the United States the federal government contributes little to elementary and secondary school funding.  Most
of this funding is provided by states or local areas.  School funding is not considered a transfer program and most of
the money for schooling goes to children who are not low-income.   Thus I have omitted it from Figure 1.
26  Data in Figure 1 through Figure 4 are from Burtless, 1994. Expenditures include both federal and state spending
and include expenditures on programs not discussed in this review such as expenditures on the school lunch and
school breakfast programs, low-income energy assistance programs, and many others.   Comparable data on all
expenditure categories were not available for more recent years.  Expenditures are adjusted for changes in prices to
1992 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditure index.23
driven by expenditures on medical care, and most of those expenditures are for the elderly.
Expenditures for food stamps and housing subsidies grew in the 1970s but were fairly flat in the
1980s.
Figure 5 compares expenditures on means-tested cash and non-cash transfers.
Expenditures on non-cash programs surpassed spending on cash programs in the early 1970s.
E.  Trends in Benefit Levels.
One of the biggest changes in AFDC after1965 was the change in the generosity of
benefits.  There are several ways to assess the generosity of benefits.  One way is to look at the
average benefit for a family with fixed characteristics.  Figure 5 shows that the benefit level for a
family of three with no other income in the median state (arrayed by benefit level) has fallen
over time.  By 1996 when AFDC was eliminated benefits for such a family were about two-
thirds their 1970 level.
Another way to assess benefit levels is to look at the average benefit per family.  Figure 6
shows that trend for the average monthly benefit per family is very close to the trend for the
maximum benefit for a family of three. The average monthly benefit per family is mainly a
function of family size.  Figure 6 also shows that the average monthly benefit per person did not
decline as much as benefits per family.  Thus part of the decline in benefits per family is due to
the fact that the average size of welfare families has declined.
27  In 1960 the average size of a
family receiving AFDC was 3.83 persons.  It rose to 3.89 in 1970 then fell to 2.94 in 1980, 2.88
in 1990, and 2.78 in 1996.
28
Unlike AFDC, SSI benefit levels are adjusted annually for changes in prices.  In constant
1996 dollars federal benefits for a single person living in an independent household have been
around $460 and benefits for a couple living independently have been around $700 (both in 1996
dollars) since the program began.  In 1975 benefit levels for individuals averaged 70.8 percent of
the federal poverty level.  By 1997 they were 77.2 percent of the poverty level.  Benefit levels
                                                
27 If the equivalence adjustment used to adjust for family size accurately captured economies of scale, the economic
well-being of families on welfare would have actually increased over time.  This is because cash welfare benefits per
person have stayed about the same while non-cash benefits increased.  However, we do not know if the equivalence
adjustment is correct.
28  U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, page 402.24
for couples were somewhat more generous compared to the poverty threshold, averaging 84.6
percent of the poverty threshold in 1975 and 91.8 percent of the poverty threshold in 1997.
29
Food stamp benefit levels have been tied to inflation since 1975.  The maximum food
stamp allotment for a family of four has fluctuated between $360 and $400 in price-adjusted
dollars over time.  For comparison, in 1995 the average monthly expenditure on food for a three-
person household was $440. The average for all single parent households was $298.
30  Increases
have been due to Congress enacting real increases in food stamp benefits.  In the early 1980s
Congress delayed cost of living increases in some years resulting in real declines in benefits.
Although maximum benefit levels have stayed relatively constant over time, the average food
stamp benefit per person has increased.  This is shown in Figure 7.  Some of this increase is due
to congressional generosity, but most of it is due to a decline in families’ income from other
sources.
Both AFDC and SSI recipients are eligible for food stamps.  Thus when these benefits
decline, food stamp benefits make up some of the difference.  Thus between 1972 and 1992
AFDC benefits for a family of three declined by 42.2 percent while food stamp benefits for the
same family increased by 37.6 percent.  The combined AFDC and food stamp benefit decreased
by 26.2 percent.
31
AFDC, food stamps and SSI are all paid monthly.  SSI benefits are for qualifying
individuals.  AFDC and food stamps are paid to the household head on behalf of all members of
a family who qualify.
F.  Trends in Caseloads.
Figure 8 shows trends in AFDC caseloads by type.  The number of AFDC recipients
increased between 1970 and 1973.  With some annual fluctuations the AFDC rolls remained
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30 These amounts are annual out-of-pocket expenditures on all food including food eaten at home and away from
home divided by twelve.  Expenditures are for “consumer units” rather than households as defined in most other
surveys.  Related persons living in the same housing unit are considered part of the same consumer unit.  If
unrelated people pool resources to buy food, housing, and other items, they are also members of the same consumer
unit.  If they are not related and do not pool resources for at least two categories of consumption, they constitute
separate consumer units.  Two percent of all households contain more than one CU.  The data come from the 1995
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey.
31 U.S. House of Representatives, 1993, page 1240.25
fairly constant until 1988 when they began to increase again. After 1995 the number of AFDC
recipients began to decline. These trends are roughly the same for the proportion of families and
the proportion of children receiving AFDC.  As Figure 8 shows the number of AFDC-UP
families has remained a small part of the overall AFDC caseload.  Table 4 shows AFDC
recipients as a percent of various population groups.  The overall percent of U.S. children
receiving benefits increased a lot beginning around 1990.  The percent of poor children receiving
benefits peaked around 1973 at 80.5 percent and declined to 60 percent in 1991.
Figure 9 shows that the number of SSI recipients declined somewhat between 1975 and
1983, partly reflecting a decline in the number of low-income elderly individuals and couples.
Between 1973, two years before the program began, and 1989 the real income of elderly
individuals increased 36.1 percent from $12,472 to $17,388 in (1996 dollars).   Over the same
period the income of elderly couples increased 23.4 percent from $29,890 to 39,888.  However,
income fell for both individuals (by 1.8 percent) and couples (by 6.4 percent) between 1989 and
1994.
In 1975 when the program began, 75.6 percent of poor elderly individuals received SSI.
By 1992 it has shrunk to 52.7 percent before rising to 63.7 percent in 1995.
32  The number of SSI
recipients grew rapidly after 1990, but the number of elderly SSI recipients continued to decline.
The increase was due to an increase in the number of children and non-elderly adults (not shown)
receiving benefits. The increase in child SSI cases is no doubt mainly a result of the Supreme
Court decision in Sullivan v. Zebley.
Figure 10 shows that the average monthly number of participants in the FSP was16.3
million persons in 1975 (the year after it became a nationally uniform program) and 25.5 million
persons in 1996. This increase reflects an increase in the U.S. population as well as an increase in
the likelihood that individuals will receive food stamps: the proportion of the population
receiving food stamps increased from 7.6 percent in 1975 to a high of 10.4 percent in 1993.  The
number of food stamp recipients has fluctuated over time.  As we will see this is partly due to
changes in the program. Like most other means-tested programs, participation in the FSP has
declined in recent years.
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As this history suggests the United States relies, perhaps more than other rich developed
countries, on families meeting their own economic needs through labor market work and living
arrangements.  American anti-poverty programs generally provide low benefits and these
benefits have been almost entirely targeted at single parent families, the elderly, and the disabled
because these groups were not expected to work in the labor market.  The federal government
has provided very little income support for able-bodied adults without children.
II.  Background on the Theory of Welfare Caseloads
 A. A Heuristic Model.
Caseloads (C) for program p at time t in state (or other geographic area) s are a function
of how many people are eligible for the program (E) and the probability that eligible individuals
or families “take-up”(T) or participate in the program:
Cpts  =  Epts * Tpts (1)
Caseloads are the sum of individual decisions about welfare participation. The economic
theory of welfare participation is based on a discrete choice model in which a utility-maximizing
individual considers whether to participate in the program by weighing the income-leisure
combination that is possible on the program and off. Off the program an individual’s
opportunities for income include marriage (or other joint living arrangements), labor market
work, and other sources of income such as child support.  On the program an individual’s income
depends on the bundle of welfare benefits available in the person’s state, which in turn depends
partly on non-welfare income.  Because the programs that are the focus of this Review are
means-tested, there is an income level above which individuals or families no longer qualify for
the program.  Families have some ability to alter their behavior to put themselves above or below
this “notch” in the budget constraint.  Economic theories of welfare participation try to take
account of such behavioral responses.
33
  The standard economic model suggests that program parameters (including interactions
among programs and state program rules), macro-economic conditions, norms and values, and
some demographic factors are exogenous “causes” of welfare caseloads.  Figure 11 is a heuristic
                                                
33 This section is intended to provide a brief background on the theory of welfare participation but not to explicate
the details of such a theory.  An interested reader should consult the large literature on the economic theory of
means-tested benefits.  See for example Ashenfelter (1983), Blank (1989), Moffitt (1985, 1992),27
diagram of the relationship between various factors that affect caseloads.  This diagram is not
meant to represent a formal model of caseload size.  As represented, the model could not be
identified and, as we will see below, it is difficult to even parameterize many of the factors
included in the model.  However, Figure 11 is a useful guide for discussing research on caseload
trends.
Figure 11 shows that program parameters, macro-economic condition, and “exogenous
demographic characteristics” affect caseloads by affecting the number of people who are eligible
for the program.  They affect the number of people who are eligible directly and indirectly by
affecting “endogenous demographic characteristics.”  Not everyone who is eligible participates
in a program. The “take-up rate” is a function of the norms and values that affect the stigma
associated with receiving benefits and program parameters that affect the transaction costs
associated with determining eligibility and getting benefits.  Below I discuss the difference
between endogenous and exogenous demographic characteristics.
  A.1 Program Parameters.  Figure 11 shows that the number of people who are eligible
for a program depends on program rules, including the availability of other potentially competing
programs.  Program parameters are important determinants of caseloads partly because they
directly determine eligibility but also because they provide incentives for people to alter their
behavior.  Both state and federal program parameters are important.
Historically, AFDC was a program for single mothers that imposed a high tax rate on
earnings.  In most cases a single mother who worked fulltime at the minimum wage earned too
much to qualify for any AFDC benefits. Thus most single mothers had three choices: they could
marry and forego welfare, they could work regularly in the labor force and forego welfare, or
they could take welfare and forego both marriage and regular labor market work.  Marriage and
labor market work are thus “endogenous demographic characteristics” reflecting the fact that
they are at least partly a response to welfare program parameters.  Fertility is another potential
endogenous demographic factor because women may choose the number of children that they
have partly in response to welfare program rules.  Food stamps have always been available to
families who meet the income criteria regardless of their marital status, so marital status is
relevant to eligibility only in so far as it affects family income and family size. SSI is mainly for
the aged, blind and disabled who meet income criteria.  Age is exogenous and though disability28
can conceivably be partly endogenous to program rules, research usually treats it as exogenous.
Age is an example of what I refer to as an “exogenous demographic characteristic.”
The two main program parameters of interest to American policy makers and researchers
are the benefit level and the “benefit reduction rate.” All else equal more generous benefits
should result in more people choosing welfare over other sources of income.  As we have seen
real AFDC benefit levels for families declined beginning in the early 1970s.  If nothing else
changed we would expect this to have reduced AFDC caseloads.
The benefit reduction rate is the amount that the government reduces welfare benefits for
each dollars of non-welfare income that a recipient gets from earnings, child support, or other
source.  Because the main alternative source of income for a welfare recipient is labor market
earnings, a high benefit reduction rate is equivalent to a high tax on earnings.  For example,
between 1988 and 1996 when a welfare recipient went to work, the first $90 in earnings per
month did not count against her benefits.  Some expenses associated with work were also not
counted. But for every dollar that she earned after that, her benefits were reduced by a dollar.
The benefit reduction rate has changed over time.  The “30-and-a-third” rule described above
was in effect before 1988 and there were several variations on the 30-and-a-third rule over the
years.
There is not agreement about how changes in the benefit reduction rate should affect
work effort much less welfare caseloads. A tax on earnings has two contradictory effects.  In
response to a high tax on wages some individuals are likely to work less in the labor market
because their foregone wage is less than it would be with a lower tax rate. But some individuals
might work more to compensate for the lower wage.
34
Other rules affect eligibility and hence caseloads.  Increasing the income level at which
families are eligible for the program clearly increases the number of families who are eligible.
As we will see changing definitions of disability can affect the SSI caseloads.  As noted above,
rules about program interactions affect eligibility and so does the relative generosity of
                                                
34  The tax rate on earnings also affects eligibility for AFDC because as the tax rate decreases the amount of income
that counts in the eligibility decision increases.  For instance, when the $90 disregard expired after four months, the
tax rate on earnings increased and that $90 also counted in determining whether the person was eligible for AFDC.
Thus, an increase in the benefit reduction rate affects the size of the caseload both “mechanically” and through
behavioral changes.29
programs.  As AFDC benefits fell relative to SSI benefits it became advantageous for parents to
try to get their children SSI rather than AFDC benefits.
A.2 Endogenous and Exogenous Demographic Characteristics.  There is room for
debate about which demographic characteristics result from “choices” (endogenous) and which
do not (exogenous).  Everyone agrees that one cannot choose one’s age.  But reasonable people
can disagree about how much “choice” low-skilled single mothers have about whether they work
in the labor market.  There is a strong theoretical rationale for expecting work effort, marriage
rates, and fertility to respond to labor market conditions and the kind of welfare programs
implemented in the United States, so most research treats them as endogenous. For most means-
tested programs eligibility and benefit levels depend both on a family’s income and on its need
for income, where need is based on family size and perhaps a few other characteristics depending
on the program.  Thus they provide an incentive to alter factors, such as number of children, that
affect need as defined by program parameters.
In the United States the endogenous demographic characteristic most likely to affect
AFDC caseloads is the number of single parent families.  Table 4 shows that the number of
single parent families has increased over the last three decades both because the number of
families has increased and because families have become more likely to be headed by a single
woman.  Divorced and widowed mothers are less likely than never married mothers to receive
means-tested benefits, partly because they are more likely to have alternative income sources
such as child support and partly because they are more likely to have skills that command a high
enough wage to make working more attractive than welfare receipt. As Table 5 shows the
number of families headed by a never married mother has increased and the share of all female-
headed families that are headed by a never married mother has increased dramatically.
AFDC targeted poor children and both AFDC and food stamp benefits increased with the
number of children in the household.  Because fertility tends to be higher among married than
unmarried women, another important way to look at the increase in single parenthood is by
looking at the number of children living with only one parent.  Table 6 shows that the percent of
children living with one parent increased very rapidly in the 1970s and again in the 1980s.
Children living with no parent are a growing part of the AFDC/TANF caseload.  The last column
in Table 6 shows that the number of children living with no parent has fluctuated, but it increased
by 46 percent between 1990 and 1996.30
Another potentially important endogenous demographic factor, especially for the FSP, is
fertility rates.  All else equal as the population caseloads will also increase.  Most research on
caseloads tries to predict either participation rates or caseload as a percent of the population.  The
participation rate is the number of participants in a program divided by the size of some
population.  For example, the participation rate of female-headed families is the percent of
female headed families that are in the program.  Population growth will not directly affect
participation rates calculated in this way.  However, fertility can affect caseloads because large
families are more likely than small families to participate in means-tested programs.  The United
States’ birth rate declined from 23.7 in 1960 to18.4 in 1970 and continued to decline to 14.6 in
1975.  It then rose to 15.9 in 1980 and 16.7 in 1990.
35  As noted above the size of the average
AFDC family has shrunk, so the average size of a welfare family is now just about the average
size for all U.S. families.
Other potentially important demographic changes are the aging of the population and the
number of immigrants.  All else equal, as the population ages we expect increases in SSI
caseloads and decreases AFDC/TANF caseloads.  The median age in the United States has
increased steadily.  Between 1980 and 1990 alone it increased from 30.0 years to 32.8 years.  It
then increased to 34.6 years in 1996.  In 1970 9.7 percent of the population was over 65 years
old.  This increased to 11.1 percent in 1980 and 12.3 percent in 1990 and has stayed relatively
constant through the 1990s.
Disability status is an important determinant of SSI participation.  There are no trend data
available for the kinds of serious disabilities that allow non-elderly adults or children to qualify
for SSI.  As we will see most of the disabling conditions that qualify non-elderly for SSI are
mental health problems.
The number of immigrants can also affect social welfare caseloads.  The number of
legally admitted immigrants has fluctuated over time.  But immigration rates have increased
from 2.1 percent of the population during the 1970s to 3.1 percent during the 1980s and 4.1
percent between 1991 and 1995.
36  It is of course impossible to know how many illegal
immigrants come to the United States. While some research suggests that legal and illegal
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36 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997 table 5.31
immigrants may increase government expenditures for Medicaid, as we will see most research
suggests that immigration plays a minor role in the size of welfare caseloads.
The model in Figure 11 suggests that everything that affects endogenous demographic
characteristics could also affect eligibility and hence welfare caseloads.  For example,
educational attainment is probably the most important determinant of work effort among both
men and women.  A vast research literature documents the relationship between educational
attainment and work effort and tries to explain why some people get more schooling than others.
But educational attainment could be endogenous if welfare programs provide education and
training opportunities or incentives to get more or less schooling.  Many other influences on
work, marriage and fertility are also likely to be endogenous with respect to the left side
variables in Figure 11.
Reviewing all the research predicting work effort, marriage, fertility and other possible
endogenous demographic characteristics is well beyond the scope of this Report, which will
largely focus on research predicting caseloads. However, I summarize research on the effect of
welfare benefit levels on single parenthood and the work effort of single mothers because
American policy makers and citizens strongly suspect that welfare begets welfare.  This research
tries to estimate the work and marriage disincentive of means-tested programs.  I also briefly
summarize the effect of job training programs on welfare recipients’ work effort.  Since the
1960s America’s social welfare policies have emphasized acquisition of human capital and have
included explicit work and training requirements.
Figure 11 also shows that both exogenous and endogenous demographic characteristics
affect program parameters.  For example, as the population in the United States ages the costs of
providing social security increase and more people are willing to make changes to the program.
The large increase in single parenthood was partly responsible for the demise of the AFDC
program.  These changes in program parameters then feed back to the number of people who are
eligible.
A.3  Economic Conditions.  All else equal factors that make labor market work more
attractive will increase work and decrease caseloads by decreasing the number of people who are
income eligible. Thus a strong economy should reduce welfare caseloads.  Researchers often use
the unemployment rate to indicate the strength of the labor market. When unemployment rates32
are low and wages increase, more people find that the benefits of labor market work out-weigh
the benefits of the welfare package.
Figure 12 shows trends in the unemployment rate since 1965.  The unemployment rate
for females was above the rate for males until the early 1980s.  Since then the unemployment
rate for females has been about the same as or less than the rate for males.  AFDC caseloads and
the unemployment rate both increased in the early 1970s.  But AFDC caseloads were fairly flat
through the 1980s when the unemployment rate fluctuated a lot.  Wages for women with less
than a high school education or only a high school education declined between 1980 and 1997,
but wages for men with the same education decreased even more (Waldfogel and Mayer 1999).
Thus the labor market conditions for low-skilled women improved relative to low-skilled men,
but declined absolutely between the early 1970s and the early 1990s.  It is hard to predict what
affect this might have on the marriage and work effort of such women. Economic conditions can
increase the attractiveness of marriage if working men are more attractive potential mates than
unemployed men.
37  But good economic times can also increase women’s labor market
opportunities, increasing their independence from both welfare and men.
A.4 Social Norms and Values.  Norms and values affect the desirability of single
parenthood, the social acceptance of labor force participation among mothers, fertility and other
demographic characteristics that can also affect caseloads.  However, we have little empirical
evidence about how norms and values influence these behaviors, so we have little idea of their
effect on caseloads relative to other factors.
Norms and values also affect the stigma associated with program participation. Welfare
stigma can reduce the inclination of eligible families to participate in welfare programs.  Some
research does try to estimate the effect of stigma on whether eligible families actually participate
in programs, but stigma is defined as the residual after other factors are controlled.  Sometimes
the political regime (net of current program parameters) in a state is taken to partly indicate
sympathy or hostility towards welfare receipt.
Norms and values can also affect program parameters. For example, the increasing social
approval for working mothers clearly encouraged legislators to pass increasingly aggressive
work rules for welfare recipients.  Norms and values can also affect many aspects of program
                                                
37 See Wilson (1987), Mare and Winship (1991) and Jencks (1992) for discussions of the hypothesis that the labor
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implementation in ways that are seldom measured.  For example, when there is a lot of social
hostility towards welfare recipients, caseworkers might treat potential recipients in ways that
discourage their participation in welfare programs.  On the other hand, in the early 1970s
caseworkers were not at all aggressive in sanctioning AFDC recipients who failed to seek work
because there was still considerable ambiguity about whether mothers of young children should
work.
A.5  Take-Up Rate.  It is well-known that not everyone who is eligible for welfare
programs participate in them.  For example, studies suggest that in the mid-1970s the percent of
the eligible population who participated  was about 69 percent in AFDC (Fraker and Moffitt
1988), 40 percent in the FSP (Fraker and Moffitt 1988, Coe 1985), and between 45 and 60
percent in SSI (Fraker and Moffitt 1988, Coe 1985). The number of eligibles who decide to
participate in a program clearly affects caseloads.  Both federal and state program rules can
affect the participation rate among eligible individuals and families by raising or lowering the
transaction costs associated with participation and by raising or lowering the benefits of the
program.  So when benefits are high and easy to get, we expect participation among eligibles to
be high.  When benefits are low and hard to get, we expect participation to be low.
III.  Explaining the Trend in AFDC Caseloads 
Researchers have used two basic classes of models to explain trends in welfare program
caseloads. One set of models uses individual-level data to estimate the effect of economic,
demographic, and program variables on a person’s or family’s probability of program
participation.  Some of these use cross-sectional data in which state variation in program
parameters and other factors are used to identify welfare effects.  Some also pool cross-sections
across years, so variation in welfare parameters and other factors come from variation over time
as well as variation across states.  These studies generally estimate the effect of a set of
individual or family characteristics (Xi¢) and a set of state-level factors (Ss¢) on a binary variable
indicating welfare participation (Pi) as follows:
  prob (Pist) =   a + bx Xi¢  + bs Sst¢ + ei              (2)
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The second set of models tries to predict state or national caseloads from aggregate
pooled cross-sectional data.  These generally try to estimate an aggregate version of equations 2.
Cst  =  a + bx X¢ i  + bs Sst¢ + es    (3)
In principle if the first set of models were correctly specified one could aggregate the
effects from individual-level models to arrive at the same conclusions about what factors affect
state caseloads as those drawn from individual-level models.  In practice these two sets of
models are usually not comparable. The marginal effects on individuals estimated in a cross-
section are likely to differ from aggregate effects estimated over time because the relationship
among variables often changes over time.  Relatively small effects might also be more precisely
estimated in aggregate models when the sample of individuals is relatively small, as is often the
case.
Other studies apply a model similar to equation 2 to panel data to try to predict changes
in welfare use over time for individual women from changes in their earnings or marital status or
changes in program parameters.  For example, they try to estimate the effect of welfare
parameters on a woman’s probability of entering AFDC, exiting AFDC, or length of AFDC
receipt.  These studies of “welfare dynamics” are less useful for understanding trends in welfare
caseloads because studies of caseloads necessarily concatenate these processes.
I organize the review of caseload research around the four left side variables in Figure 11.
I then briefly discuss the research on welfare dynamics. Two other research traditions are related
to research on caseloads.  One tries to predict the probability of employment for single mothers
from welfare program parameters and labor market conditions.  Another tries to predict the
probability that a mother is married from similar models.  In the next section I argue that
contrary to popular belief these studies are not especially valuable for understanding caseload
trends.  Nonetheless, because these studies represent a large part of the research literature often
used to understand shifts in caseloads I review the major findings from this literature before
turning to research specifically on caseloads.
A.  Research on Work and Marriage Disincentives.
Much of the research predicting work effort and marriage has been motivated by an
attempt to understand the disincentive effects of welfare programs, mainly AFDC.  Put another
way it tries to estimate the effect of the factors on the left side of Figure 11 on endogenous35
demographic characteristics.  These studies try to estimate the probability that a single mother i
will work from the local labor market conditions (Ls) and welfare program parameters in the
state (Ws):
prob (workis) = b0 +  bL Ls+ bwWs + ei (4)
Others try to predict the probability of marriage conditional on having a child on local labor
market conditions, welfare parameters and, usually some information on characteristics of
potential mate (Mi) for the woman.
prob (marriageis çchild) = b0 +  bL Li+ bwWs + bmMi + ei (5)
These studies are useful for predicting two important determinants of eligibility, namely the
work effort of single mothers and the marriage probabilities of women with children.  But as
Figure 11 demonstrates many factors other than work and marriage can affect caseloads.  Put
another way, research on work or marriage disincentives predicts only two of many possible
endogenous demographic characteristics and endogenous demographic characteristics are only
one of the two variables in equation 1 that determine caseload size (the other is take-up rates).
This would not be a problem if take-up rates were the same for those who remain eligible
because they do not work or marry and those who do work or marry.  In that case T in equation 1
would be constant, so if we knew how work effort affected eligibility we would also know how
caseloads change.  But as we will see take-up rates vary by the same factors that predict work
and marriage.  Recipients who are the least likely to find a job or a husband have the highest
take-up rate. Thus if a program change reduces the number of single mothers who are eligible for
AFDC/TANF by X, it is likely to reduce the caseloads by some (unknown) fraction of X.
Furthermore individuals can in principle both work and receive welfare benefits. Thus
some proportion of those who work remain eligible for benefits.  The proportion of single
mothers who both work and receive welfare has varied from a high of 16.5 percent in 1974 to a
low of 8.1 percent in 1984.  It is also in principle possible for married couples to receive welfare,
though few do.  Thus a woman’s probability of participation in welfare (Pi) in state s is a
function of her probability of work, her probability of remaining eligible when she does work
and her probability of taking welfare if she remains eligible:
 prob (Pis) = prob (workis ) * prob (Eis) * prob (Tis )  (6)
To then estimate the effect of a change in work probability on caseloads we would have to sum
across individuals.  The research on work disincentives estimates only the effect of welfare36
parameters on the probability of work (or hours of work), so it can tell us a limited amount about
the effect of welfare parameters on caseloads.  An analogous argument can be made about
research on marriage.
Furthermore few studies try to jointly predict work.  Imagine that a change in a program
parameter, which I will call A, increases the likelihood of marriage and decreases the likelihood
of work (for example A could implement a high tax on a single earner and no tax on a married
earner). A study that ignores the effect of A on marriage but finds that it reduces work effort
among single mothers, might be taken as evidence that implementing A would increase
caseloads when in fact implementing A could leave caseloads unchanged or even increase them.
Thus while research on work and marriage disincentives is useful for understanding how
program parameters and other factors predict some important determinants of eligibility, it is not
ideal for understanding changes in caseloads.  Nonetheless I summarize the major findings from
that research because it addresses the important question of whether welfare itself might increase
caseloads by causing the behaviors that lead to poverty and welfare dependency.
Instead of summarizing the large number of individual studies on this topic, I summarize
the major summaries of the research.  There are four major summaries of these two research
traditions (Danziger et al. 1981 and 1982, Moffitt 1992, and Hoynes 1997).  I begin by
summarizing these reviews.  I then describe a few more recent studies.
Researchers have used two techniques to estimate the effect of AFDC on work effort and
marriage probabilities.  One approach is to compare trends in the number of single mothers or
trends in the hours worked by single mothers to trends in AFDC program parameters, mainly the
benefit level.  Because other things that affect single parenthood and labor market work also
change over time, we cannot be certain that trends in AFDC program parameters cause the
observed trends in single parenthood or work effort among single mothers. Nonetheless,
comparing trends provides prima facia evidence about the effect of welfare on work and
marriage. The second technique is to econometrically estimate the effect of program parameters
on work or marriage using differences over time or across states to identify program effects.
 A.1 Work Disincentives. The proportion of single mothers who work has hardly
changed over time.  The proportion of single mothers aged nineteen to forty-four (the age range
in which they are likely to qualify for AFDC) who worked was 74.3 percent in 1967, 72.2
percent in 1973 when AFDC benefits reached their highest level, and 75.9 percent in 1990 when37
welfare benefits had lost nearly half their value (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1999a).
38 The number
of hours that single mothers worked fell over the late 1960s and early 1970s when AFDC
benefits increased and rose slightly in the mid-1970 when benefits decreased.  But hours of work
among single mothers leveled off in the 1980s as AFDC benefits continued to decline (Moffitt
1992).  Moffitt (1992) notes the most striking feature of the trends in work effort among single
mothers is their stability over time despite rather large changes in AFDC benefits and the benefit
reduction rate. Thus the evidence from trends does not support the notion that the generosity of
welfare is likely to have a large effect on the employment of single mothers.
  A second set of studies tries to estimate the effect of AFDC benefit levels and benefit
reduction rates on the labor force participation of female headed families econometrically using
cross-sectional or time-series state variation in the AFDC program.  These studies find that
higher AFDC benefits are associated with less labor market work among single mothers, but the
range of the estimated effect is large.  Danziger et al. (1981) estimated that the reduction in work
effort in several studies ranged from 1 hour to 9.8 hours of work per week corresponding to 10 to
50 percent of labor supply levels.  Because AFDC recipients worked on average 9 hours per
week this implies that they would have worked between 10 and 19 hours in the absence of
AFDC.   These studies also imply that the work disincentive of AFDC probably has little effect
on caseloads.  Few single mothers reduce work effort to become eligible for AFDC, and even if
eligible women increased their work effort in the estimated range, they would mostly have
retained eligibility for AFDC (although their benefits would presumably decline).
Most of these studies estimate work effort from variation in AFDC benefit levels and not
from variation in the total benefit package. A few take into account the combined value of AFDC
and food stamps.  Historically, Medicaid benefits were closely tied to receipt of AFDC.  Thus the
disincentives associated with AFDC may be at least partly a proxy for the disincentive effect of
Medicaid.  Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) calculate the insurance value of Medicaid for families
based on the health status of their members. They find that once the insurance value of Medicaid
is controlled the state AFDC benefit level has no effect on single mothers’ labor supply. As
Moffitt and Wolfe note, this should not be surprising because in their sample the estimated
                                                
38  As noted the number of single mothers who both work and receive welfare has changed over time.  If the number
of single mothers who work has remained fairly constant, it must be the case that what has changed is their ability to
combine welfare with work. This in turn depends on program rules, wage rates, and hours worked.38
annual medical expenditure of families on AFDC is $4229 (in 1990 dollars) while the mean
annual combined food stamp and AFDC transfer was $5912.  So Medicaid transfers to families
are large relative to other programs and therefore could be expected to have a large behavioral
effect. These results imply that most if not all the labor supply effect of welfare is due to
families’ desire for medical insurance.  Put another way, it implies that single mothers might be
more likely to work if they did not have to give up their health insurance when they took a job.
This was the assumption behind the changes to Medicaid during the 1980s and 1990s that de-
coupled Medicaid eligibility from AFDC eligibility and made higher income children eligible for
Medicaid.
The main methodological problem faced by research on the work disincentives of AFDC
is the problem of selection bias.  Women who participate in AFDC have lower hours of work
than those who do not participate.  But they would probably have lower hours of work even in
the absence of welfare. The main technique that researchers have used to overcome the problem
of selection bias is to control characteristics of women expected to affect their labor supply or to
stratify the sample on these characteristics.  A few studies jointly estimate participation and labor
supply equations (Fraker and Moffitt 1988).
This research may over-state the work disincentive of AFDC.  Recent ethnographic
research by Edin and Lein (1997) finds that most single mothers on welfare supplement their
income through unreported work.  This work is unreported because women would lose some of
the their benefits if they reported their earnings.  But the work is also often irregular and
sometimes illegal.
A.2 Marriage Disincentives.
39 Female headship increased both during the 1960s and
1970s when the total welfare benefit package increased.  But female headship continued to
increase in the 1980s and 1990s when welfare benefits were flat or decreasing.  Thus trend data
do not support the hypothesis that AFDC benefits provide a strong disincentive to marry.
Econometric models of the marriage disincentive generally try to estimate the effect of
AFDC benefit levels and other program parameters on single parenthood holding constant labor
market conditions.  The results from such studies done in the 1970s are so mixed that few
conclusions can be drawn from them.  In a review of this research Groeneveld et al. (1983) found
                                                
39 For reviews of the research on the effect of AFDC benefit levels on household composition see Groenveld et al.
(1983) and Moffitt (1992).39
that in over half the studies welfare benefit levels had either no effect on marriage or that higher
benefits decreased single parenthood.  In the studies that did find that higher benefits increased
single parenthood, the effects were generally small in magnitude or weak in statistical
significance.
These early studies had several short-comings.  First, many single mothers in a state may
have become single mothers under different benefit circumstances, and few of these studies try
to model lags in program parameters.  Second, these studies largely ignored the possibility that
state variations in religion, culture, and other factors could affect both marriage rates and AFDC
benefit levels. Few studies used state fixed-effects or other techniques to control relevant
unmeasured state characteristics.
Studies from the 1980s provide more consistent evidence that AFDC benefit levels
increase single motherhood, but the estimated effect is generally small. One of the best known
studies of the effect of AFDC benefit levels on single parenthood is Ellwood and Bane (1985)
and the extensions by Ellwood (1986).  They used a variety of data sources to compare rates of
female headship in states with different AFDC benefit levels controlling numerous state
characteristics.  They also use a variety of techniques to control unmeasured differences across
states likely to affect both AFDC benefit levels and probability of single parenthood.  They
estimated the effect of a change in benefit levels in a state on the change in the rate of single
parenthood in the state, thereby holding constant all invariant state characteristics such as culture
and climate.  They compared the divorce rate among couples with and without children in high
and low-benefit states.  The assumption of this technique was that because AFDC is a program
only for families with children it should not affect the decisions of childless couples. Finally they
compared divorce or non-marital births among women who were likely to get AFDC and those
who are unlikely to get AFDC (based on their individual characteristics).  Ellwood and Bane
found no statistically significant relationship between benefit levels and births to young, never-
married women or first births to women of any age.
  Robert Moffitt (1990) estimated the effect of the combined benefits from AFDC, food
stamps, and Medicaid on marital status of both men and women using CPS data for 1969, 1977,
and 1985.  Pooling data for all three years and controlling women’s age and education, the
Census region in which she lived, and whether she lived in a metropolitan area, the amount of
                                                                                                                                                            40
the total welfare package had only a small and statistically insignificant effect on the probability
of marriage among either black or white women.  Moffitt’s results did however show that a $100
increase in the cash transfer from AFDC had a smaller effect on marriage probabilities than a
$100 increase in the total benefit package. This implies that the benefits from food stamps and
Medicaid have a greater effect on single parenthood than the cash transfer.  Moffitt concludes
that the decision to marry is influenced more by the availability of health insurance than by the
cash transfer.  Single mothers may remain single in part to assure that their children get health
insurance.  This is consistent with the research on the work disincentive of AFDC.
In 1992 Moffitt published a review of the research on the marriage disincentive of
welfare in which he concluded that there was little evidence of a marriage disincentive. After
Moffitt’s (1992) review, most people thought that at most the effects of welfare benefit levels on
single parenthood was small and that any observed effect was probably mostly attributable to the
need for health insurance.  Subsequent studies supported that view (Hoynes 1997). More recent
research revisited this question and re-ignited the controversy.  Following I describe a few
studies that are representative of this new wave of research.  Moffitt (1998) summarizes some of
these as well studies as well as a few others.
Mayer (1997) used PSID data to estimate the effect of AFDC benefit levels on the
difference in the probability that teenage girls raised in married couple families and children
raised in single parent families had a baby.
40  Mayer made a similar comparison for the
probability that girls raised in each kind of family would grow up to be a single parent.  States
differ not only in the welfare benefit level but also in many other ways.  Children raised in
married couple families seldom qualify for AFDC.  If the other state characteristics affect all
children in a state, but the welfare benefit level only affects children raised in single parent
families, this comparison should provide a test of the effect of AFDC benefit levels on teenage
childbearing and single parenthood.  Mayer also estimates the effect of AFDC benefits in the
                                                
40  Teenage childbearing is potentially important for AFDC caseloads because teen mothers are more likely to get
welfare and to get it for longer periods of time than women who delay childbearing.  Teen childbearing rates have
fallen in the United States over nearly the entire period of AFDC’s existence (it rose slightly in the late 1980s and
early 1990s).  Because the proportion of older mothers having children declined even more rapidly than the
proportion of teenagers having babies over this period, the proportion of children born to teenage mothers increased.
Several studies have looked at the effect of welfare on teen childbearing (Ellwood and Bane (1985), Plotnick (1990),
and Haveman and Wolfe (1994).  These studies found small and statistically insignificant effects of welfare
parameters on teenage childbearing.41
state in which a child grew-up.  Thus she estimates the effect of the benefit level before a woman
has a child.  Mayer estimates that doubling AFDC benefits would increase the gap in teenage
childbearing between children from married couple families and children from single parent
families by 2.5 percentage points (or about 12 percent of the national teen childbearing rate).  It
would increase the gap in growing up to be a single parent between children raised in married
couple and single parent families by about 8 percentage points (or about 18 percent of the
national average). This suggests that AFDC benefit levels have a nontrivial effect on rates of
single parenthood.
Using NLSY data, Mark Rosenzweig (1995) found that a one standard deviation decrease
in AFDC benefits (37 percent) was associated with a decrease from 10.4 percent to 7 percent in
the proportion of women under 22 years of age with a non-marital birth.  The decline was from
17 percent to 9.6 percent for low-income women in the same age range.  Rosenzweig’s model
differed from earlier research in that it included cohort and state fixed-effects and extensive
controls for women’s own characteristics.  Cohort fixed-effects in principle control for changes
in norms and values regarding unwed motherhood as well as changes in birth control technology
and other factors that have changed over time.
Hoffman and Foster’s (1998) replication using PSID data also finds that in some models
AFDC benefit levels have a positive effect on the proportion of women with a non-marital birth.
However they also find that Rosenzweig’s results are not robust to changes in data and
reasonable changes in the model.  They also find that the effect of higher benefits is to reduce
marital births (thereby increasing the proportion of women with no birth or a non-marital birth).
But the model of welfare disincentives predicts that lower benefits should reduce non-marital
births not marital births.  Hoffman and Foster argue that because these effects are inconsistent
with the underlying theory and because they are not robust, Rosenzweig’s results should be
interpreted cautiously.
41
                                                
41 AFDC can also affect the living arrangements of a single mother, especially the likelihood that a teenage single
mother lives with her parents.  Higher welfare benefits allow more women to set up their own household, many
people have suspected that welfare benefits encourages teenage mothers to move out of their parents’ household and
into one of their own.  In fact TANF rules require teenage mothers to marry or live with an adult.  Only a few
studies try to estimate the effect of AFDC benefit levels on living arrangements.  In the best-known study, Ellwood
and Bane (1985) found that higher welfare benefits were associated with young single mothers living on their own.
Ellwood and Bane’s estimates suggest that a $100 increase in benefits (in 1975 dollars, equal to about 15 percent of
the median benefit level) could decrease the number of teenage mothers who live at home by 30 percent.42
These later studies do a much better job of controlling unobserved state characteristics
and modeling welfare effects. Thus they are probably more creditable than earlier studies
showing smaller effects.
Taken together this research suggest that AFDC benefit levels may have had an important
effect on single motherhood at least among women most likely to get welfare if they become
single mothers.  Benefit levels may also have affected the work effort of single mothers most
likely to get welfare.  However, AFDC benefit levels probably had at most a modest effect on the
overall growth of single parenthood and on the overall work effort of single mothers.  A
substantial part of the disincentives that appear to result from AFDC benefit levels may actually
be attributable to families’ trying to keep health insurance.  If AFDC or other welfare benefits
modestly affect single parenthood and work effort of single mothers, they probably have at most
a small effect on caseloads.  Whether one thinks that the modest disincentives of welfare are a
serious problem depends on one’s view about how large the benefits from such programs are.
Although we have rather a lot of diverse opinion on this point, we have relatively little direct
evidence.
42
B. The Effect of Job Training on Work Effort
Since 1967 welfare recipients have been required to be engaged in work activities.  These
could include searching for work, training for work or actually working.  Over the years the
United States has had a variety of different programs aimed at getting welfare recipients to work.
A few programs have tried to provide wage subsidies to employers or workers, a few are aimed
at matching employers and workers, but the largest programs have been those that try to alter
labor supply by training welfare recipients (or potential recipients) in an attempt to reduce
welfare use.
43 The most well know of the latter programs are Work Incentive (WIN) program,
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
and Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs.
44
                                                
42 The conclusions in this section regarding the effect of welfare on marriage are shared by Moffitt (1998) in his
latest review of the evidence on this topic.
43 See Bassi (1995) for a summary of different kinds of “active labor market” policies that have been tried and
evaluated in the United States.
44 CETA was largely implemented as a counter-cyclical employment program.  It had a large public service
employment component as well as a smaller component for training disadvantaged individuals including actual and43
For three decades social scientists have evaluated these programs. Unlike research on
other welfare programs much of this research has used experimental designs in which some
eligible individuals are randomly assigned to participate in a program and others are assigned to
a control group.  Then the two groups are compared to determine the program effects.
45  These
experimental studies have had a great deal of influence because the results are convincing and
easy for policy makers and the public to understand.
46
These studies consistently find little or no employment gains or wage gains from
participating in government sponsored training programs for men and youth.
47  Research is more
encouraging for welfare-to-work programs that try to get women who are already on welfare into
the labor market.  The studies generally find that even modest help in job search increases
employment and earnings among welfare recipients.  They also find that welfare-to-work
programs are generally cost effective.  The programs tend to provide very modest help at a low
cost and generate a somewhat less modest gain in employment and wages and decrease in
welfare benefits.   Typically income gains from participation in welfare-to-work programs is in
the range of $150 to $600 per year (Blank 1997a).  The highest estimated gain for any program
was $1,000 per year.  Typically these gains are large enough to reduce the welfare benefits that
families receive but not to get them off of welfare altogether.  Therefore these programs have at
most a modest impact on welfare caseloads.
This may not be surprising.  First most welfare recipients have some work experience and
most remain on welfare for only a short period of time.  Half of those who leave do so because
they have gotten a job.  Thus for most welfare recipients, welfare operates somewhat like
                                                                                                                                                            
potential welfare recipients.  (See U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, page 1692 for information on job training
programs for disadvantaged populations including CETA.)
45 The Negative Income Tax Experiments sponsored by the federal government were an attempt to use random
assignment to estimate the effect of various welfare program parameters on work and marriage.  I do not review
these studies here because the program designs that were evaluated were not particularly relevant to those that were
actually implemented on a large scale, and because many of the experiments suffered from serious problems.  See
Groenveld et al. (983) and Munnell (1987).
46 Manski and Garfinkel (1992) provide an excellent review of methodological and statistical issues involved in
evaluating welfare to work programs.  Nathan (1988) also provides a discussion of issues related to random
assignment evaluations of welfare-to-work and other policies.
47  See Barnow (1987) for an early review of this research.  See Gueron and Pauly for a review of of evaluations of
state welfare-to-work programs prior to 1989 (when JOBS programs were mandated).  See also Lalonde (1995) for
an up-dated review.  An excellent discussion of welfare-to-work programs is provided in Friedlander and Burtless
(1995).44
unemployment insurance.  For such women small amounts of job training are unlikely to make a
big difference – they already have sufficient skill to be employed.  But help in getting another
job might pay off in reducing the period of unemployment.  Welfare recipients with little work
experience also tend to be young, have young children, and have little education.  Help in getting
initial work experience might help them quite a bit.  But so might help with child care and basic
skills. 
48
C.  Research on Caseloads.
Research using aggregate-level data to model the size of state caseloads is relatively
recent and includes relatively few studies. Like research on the disincentives of welfare, studies
of AFDC caseloads use variation over time and across states in the labor market and in AFDC
program rules to predict caseloads.
C.1 Effect of AFDC Program Parameters and the Macro-Economy.   Most of the
recent research on caseloads tries to estimate the relative importance of changes in the AFDC
program and changes in the economy on AFDC caseloads. This research was initially intended to
explain the increase in AFDC caseloads between 1990 and 1993.  But much of the research now
tries to explain the decline in caseloads after 1993.  Because economic conditions changed at the
same time that Congress implemented changes to social welfare programs, a debate emerged
over whether the change in caseload was the result of economic or program changes.  Thus in
this section I focus on these two factors together.
Between 1960 and 1973 AFDC benefit levels increased and the caseload grew.  Between
1973 and 1987 the AFDC benefit per family declined but the number of recipients hardly
changed.  During this period food stamps and Medicaid became more generous, but still the total
benefit package available to AFDC families including non-cash benefits declined after the mid-
1970s.  AFDC caseloads increased in the late 1980 and early 1990s even though welfare benefits
continued to decline.  Thus simple trend data do not suggest that benefit levels have much effect
on caseloads.  Of course many other things were happening during this time that could have
affected the caseload.
                                                
48 In fact some research suggests that job search programs have the greatest effect on the most and least
disadvantaged welfare recipients (Blank 1997a).45
Some studies have estimated the effect of economic conditions on state caseloads while
ignoring the effect of changes in welfare policy (see Peskin et al. 1993).  Economic and welfare
program variables are likely to be correlated.  For example, states with a high unemployment rate
may also have low benefit levels.  Thus such studies can tell us little about the causal effect of
economic factors on caseloads.  Several early studies try to predict changes in AFDC caseloads
over time in only one state.
49  These studies obviously control all invariant state characteristics,
but they seldom control all the state characteristics that change and might affect caseloads.
Because some unmeasured changes in state characteristics are likely to be both correlated with
the changes in the welfare program and changes in caseloads, these studies are likely to produce
biased estimates of the effect of program parameters and labor market conditions on caseloads.
Other studies use data for several states but only a few years (Gabe 1992 and others).
These studies seldom control state characteristics likely to be correlated with welfare program
parameters, so they too provide little information about the cause of changes in AFDC caseloads.
A few studies try to estimate national AFDC caseloads from national aggregate data over
time. Grossman (1985) does this, but in a second study she predicts state caseloads from pooled
state cross-sectional data then sums the with-in state estimates to get a second national estimate.
In the latter model she predicts the state quarterly number of persons receiving AFDC from 1974
to 1983 using state and year fixed-effects, a dummy variable for the1981 OBRA, the state’s
standard of need for a family of three, the number of persons in the state who are unemployed
(with four lags), and the number of female-headed households.  She finds a relatively small R
2
for her model and a relatively weak effect of the standard of need on the size of caseloads.  Her
estimates using national data for predicting national caseload trends had a higher R
2 and
generally predicted the trends in caseloads better than her state-level models aggregated to the
national level.
Grossman’s model has been criticized because using a dummy variable for OBRA
constrains its effect to be the same in all states.  Because states differ tremendously in size, the
effect of implementing OBRA on the absolute level of level of caseloads is likely to differ across
states.  We might expect 1981 OBRA (and other program changes) to change caseloads by the
                                                
49 In this section I review studies that try to estimate national trends in caseloads.  I do not include studies that try to
predict changes in caseloads in just one state. Studies that try to forecast state AFDC caseloads include Barnow
(1988), Garasky (1989) and O’Neill (1990). Many states have their own models for predicting caseloads.  Many of
these are reviewed in the Lewin Group (1997).46
same percent rather than by the same number across state.  Later studies almost all use the log of
caseloads as the dependent variable so that a unit change in an independent variable has the same
percentage change on the dependent variable.
50  In addition, because the number of female-
headed families is presumably somewhat endogenous, her estimates of the effect of program
parameters might be downwardly biased.
 A 1993 CBO report uses a model similar to Grossman’s to predict quarterly national
caseloads from 1972 to 1991. The independent variables include two program variables, namely
the real AFDC benefit level and a dummy variable for 1981 and all subsequent years indicating
that the 1981 OBRA was in effect.  It also included two measures of economic conditions.  The
first is a measure of the “employment gap,” which is intended to measure difference between the
economy’s potential and actual employment.  Its construction depends on what most people now
think of as highly tenuous assumptions about the natural rate of employment. However, it tracks
the unemployment rate very closely. The second labor market variable is real earnings for
women with a high school diploma.  The model also includes lags for the employment gap and a
measure of the rate of single motherhood.
The CBO study found that a 5 percent rise in AFDC benefits was associated with a 0.2
percent rise in caseloads.  The 1981 OBRA appears to have lowered caseloads, mainly because it
reduced eligibility for AFDC.  Turning to the economic variables, the wage rate for women had
little effect on caseloads.  But the employment gap had a large effect.  A 1 percent increase in the
employment gap is associated with a .5 percent increase in AFDC-basic quarterly caseloads. The
same increase in the employment gap actually increases the AFDC-UP caseload by 1.5 percent.
A one-time increase in the gap also affects caseloads for several quarters.
A set of recent studies uses pooled cross-section time series data to estimate AFDC
caseloads.  These are described in Table 7.  The model in these studies are similar to Grossman’s
model predicting state caseloads, but these studies all try to predict the natural log of the percent
of the population receiving welfare in a state and year. The economic variable of interest in most
studies is the state unemployment rate and the program variable is usually an indicator variable
                                                                                                                                                            
50  Most of the studies cited in this paper provide some review of the relevant research literature.  The Lewin Group
(1997) provides an especially rich review of research early aggregate level models of state caseloads and a good
critique of methodological issues associated with estimating such models.47
equal to 1 when the state has been granted a waiver (and thus has changed its welfare policy).
The basic model is:
ln Rst = a + bu Ust + bw Wst + bx X¢s  + gs + gt + est (7)
where R is the share of the population receiving welfare, U is the unemployment rate, W is a
dummy variable indicating whether the state has a waiver in effect in a year,
51 X¢  is a set of other
control variables, g indicates a fixed effect, s indexes states and t indexes time.
52  Year fixed-
effects control time varying factors that affect all states, such as national changes in welfare
policy or tax codes and presumably national changes in norms and values.  State fixed-effects
control all time-invariant factors within states, such as fixed cultural attributes of the state
population and fixed aspects of the industrial composition.   With both year dummies and states
dummies a coefficient represents the effect of a change in the independent variable on the
deviation from the state-specific trend in the per capita caseload.  Put another way, this model
estimates the effect of within-state changes in independent variables on changes in caseloads.
The unemployment rate and AFDC waivers are expected to affect eligibility. Waivers can also in
principle affect the take-up rate and X¢s can affect both eligibility and take-up.  The use of a
dummy variable for waivers presents some problems that I discuss below.  Some of these studies
also control demographic and other characteristics of states that might affect stigma.  I discuss
the effect of these factors below.
In most of the studies caseload data come from state administrative records.  Data on
unemployment rates and state demographic characteristics come from large nationally
representative data sets such as the CPS or Census.
As Table 7 shows these studies generally find that economic variables have an important
effect on caseloads. A 1-point rise in the unemployment rate results in a 3 percent to 5.9 percent
rise in AFDC caseloads.  The effect of waivers is more variable in these studies. Waivers appear
to decrease caseloads by anywhere from 5.1 to 15 percent.
                                                
51 In all studies waivers are coded only after 1993.  Before that year most waivers affected only a small number of
recipients in a state.  Most studies do not control other major program changes in states.
52 Because these studies use year by state data, the number of cases is the number of years times 51 (50 states plus
the District of Columbia).  Thus, for example, the CEA study uses data for 51 states over 21 years for a total of 1071
observations.48
These studies also include many variations to the basic model in equation 1.  The
variations are intended to overcome several potential sources of error in the model and to resolve
some of the discrepancies in the estimates.
53  One of the greatest discrepancies is between the
results in Ziliak et al. (1997) and the other studies.  Ziliak et al. find that economic factors
explain much more of the change in caseloads than the other studies, and correspondingly that
waivers explain much less of the change in caseloads.  Figlio and Ziliak (1999) try to reconcile
the difference between the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) study and Ziliak et al. and
Wallace and Blank (1999) try to reconcile the discrepancies between Blank (1997b) and Zilliak
et al.  Both studies do this by testing the sensitivity of the results to differences among the
studies.
Unlike most of the other studies, Ziliak et al. use monthly rather than annual data on
caseloads.  But both Figlio and Ziliak and Wallace and Blank find that monthly and annual data
provide very similar estimates of the effect of the unemployment rate on caseloads.  The data in
Ziglio et al. covers a shorter time period than CEA or Blank.   Figlio and Ziliak find that this
does not account for the greater explanatory power of the unemployment rate in Ziliak et al.  The
CEA uses recipients per capita rather than cases per capita.
54  But results are not sensitive to this
difference either.
Ziliak et al. did not include welfare benefits as a regressor in their models. They argued
that while benefit levels might affect caseloads, the caseload size might also affect benefit levels.
Since they had no instrument to account for this simultaneity, they omitted benefit levels all
together. But omitting benefit levels did not affect Ziliak et al.’s conclusions, presumably
because welfare benefit levels are not strongly correlated with the unemployment rate or whether
a state had a waiver.  Nor did weighting the state-level data by the state population affect the
Ziliak et al. results.  Whether the model tries to explain levels of caseloads or changes in
caseloads also accounts for little of the difference in the results.
Figlio and Ziliak find that the main difference between Ziliak et al. and other studies is
the way Ziliak et al. model dynamics.  Most studies code waivers as equal to one in all years
subsequent to the year in which the waiver was granted.  But waivers may have effects before
                                                
53 See Martini and Wiseman, 1997 for a critique of the CEA study, which raises many of these issues.
54 A case usually includes several recipients since a case is usually a family.49
they are granted if case workers and potential and actual recipients anticipate them. On the other
hand, a significant amount of time sometimes passed between when a waiver was granted and
when it was implemented. The CEA report experimented with including a variable equal to one
in the year prior to a waiver being enacted and found that states averaged a 6.3 percent decline in
caseloads in the year before a waiver was granted.  Blank found the same thing.  It is difficult to
know what this means.  Blank argues that a waiver could not have an effect on caseloads before
it is implemented and therefore that the apparent effect of waivers is really due to things that
were changing in states prior to their getting a waiver.  Thus the waiver program per se may not
affect caseloads.
55  But recipients or potential recipients may also change their behavior in
anticipation of the waiver.  For example, if it is well-known that a waiver requiring work or
training is about to implemented, some people will be more aggressive about getting or keeping
work than they would have been if they did not anticipate the waiver.  This result could also
mean that states with a high probability of a caseload drop were more likely to receive waivers.
 Because of these problems Figlio and Ziliak do not model lags in the implementation of
waivers, but they do model state dependence in caseloads by including lags for caseload size as
regressors.  They also modeled delayed reactions to macro-economic changes by including
several lags in the unemployment rate.  The CEA report found that a one-year lag on the
unemployment rate was a stronger predictor than the current unemployment rate of caseload
levels, and that it reduced the effect of current year unemployment rates considerably.
56 Figlio
and Ziliak  found that controlling for caseload dynamics and the lagged unemployment rate
reduced the effect of waivers on caseloads during the pre-TANF period.  They estimate that
using annual data on state caseloads and modeling first differences, the unemployment rate
accounts for 30.7 percent of the decline in caseloads between 1993 and 1996, and waivers
account for –5.7 percent of the decline (that is it increased caseloads).  They argue that an
                                                
55 One way to test for possible endogeneity is to use a measure of future caseloads rather than past caseloads as an
independent variable.  On the assumption that future outcomes cannot be true causal influences on contemporaneous
outcomes, the coefficients on such variables can be interpreted as measuring persistent unobserved effects.  (See
Mayer 1997 for rationales for this approach.)
56 The coefficient for the current year unemployment rate declined from .031 (standard error = .003) to -.009
(standard error = .004) when the previous year’s unemployment rate was added to the model.  Its coefficient was
.045 (standard error = .004).50
increase in caseloads due to waivers is not implausible if some waivers decrease caseloads (such
as JOBS sanctions) and others increase them (such as higher earnings disregards).
Bartik and Eberts (1999) also find that their results are sensitive to the dynamic
specification of the dependent variable. The effect of the unemployment rate is largest with no
lags in caseloads (a one point increase in unemployment increased caseloads by 6 percent) and
smallest when the dependent variable is the change in caseloads (a one point increase in
unemployment increased caseloads by 1.3 percent).
Bartik and Eberts also argue that most other research on caseloads uses a fairly weak
measure of the macro-economy, namely the unemployment rate.  Using a weak measure of the
macro-economy would presumably downwardly bias its estimated effect and possibly bias the
estimated effect of other variables in the model as well.  To overcome this potential problem,
they include three variables, in addition to the state unemployment rate, which are intended to
measure the structure of the labor market.  These include state employment growth, the state
average wage premium, the extent to which state industries are likely to hire people without a
high school degree, and the extent to which they are likely to hire welfare recipients.  Bartik and
Eberts find that the increase in caseloads in the late 1980s was due largely to a decrease in
demand for low skilled workers. The correlation between the unemployment rate and these other
measures is not extremely high.  For example, the correlation between the unemployment rate
and employment growth is -.538, so it is possible that states can experience unemployment even
with employment growth and vice versa. But these additional labor force variables do not do
better than the unemployment rate alone at explaining the recent decline in caseloads.
One potential problem with several of these studies is that an indicator variable for
welfare waivers is a weak measure of welfare changes and therefore may produce a downwardly
biased estimate of the effect of welfare changes on caseloads.  Blank and the CEA study
modeled the effect of different types of waivers, as did Figlio and Ziliak in their attempt to
reconcile differences among studies.  Not only did modeling different kinds of waivers not
reconcile these differences, but the results regarding the importance of difference kinds of
waivers are inconsistent, raising questions about the meaning of the effect of waivers in these
models.
The CEA study found that only waivers that provided sanctions for failing to meet the
requirements of the JOBS program had a statistically significant effect (at the .05 level) on51
caseloads. Using the same model as the CEA report but omitting data for 1977 and 1996, Moffitt
(1999) finds that the effect of waivers that implemented “family caps” and waivers that
implemented work requirements were statistically significant, but those that implemented
sanctions in the JOBS program were not.
57  Since waivers were not coded prior to 1993, the
difference in the CEA estimates and his is entirely due to omitting 1996 data.  Moffitt argues that
the sensitivity of the effect for different kinds of waivers to the years selected raises suspicion
that these variables are not measuring the effects of the separate waivers.
 Blank (1997b) also raises doubts about the meaning of the effect of waivers.  She found
that the strongest effect among the different kinds of waivers was for waivers that implemented a
family cap.  Implementation of a family cap was associated with an 18 percent reduction in the
AFDC caseload.  Blank argues that this effect is too large to be realistic. A family cap is not
likely to affect caseloads in the short-run because it holds constant the benefit level for women
on the program who has a additional child, but it does not reduce benefits or remove families
from the rolls.
58  Blank takes the apparent effect of family cap waivers as evidence that the
estimated effect of waivers is really due to other changes that took place in the state around the
same time as waivers were implemented.
These models tend not to explain much of the change in caseloads.  For example, Blank’s
model predicts a decline in caseloads between 1979 and 1986 when caseloads remained constant.
Between 1987 and 1995 when caseloads rose, the model predicted a decline.  But Blank finds
that her model predicts some changes in AFDC caseloads better than others. Beginning in the
early 1980s, child-only cases increased relative to other kinds of AFDC cases.
59  When Blank re-
estimates her model eliminating child-only cases, she find that it explains a large part of the trend
in caseloads.  In fact, Blank finds that her model predicts changes in AFDC-UP caseloads rather
well, AFDC-Basic caseloads moderately well, and child only case loads hardly at all.  It is
                                                
57  Family caps mean that welfare recipients do not get an increase in AFDC benefits when they have an additional
child.  Before waivers allowing family caps were implemented benefit levels in all states depended on family size,
though the increase in benefits when a woman had an addition child varied greatly across states.
58 As Blank notes, a study of the family cap in New Jersey, the first state to implement the policy, found that AFDC
use fell as much for those subject to the cap and for those in a control group not subject to it.
59 Child-only cases are cases in which a child but no adults in the household receives AFDC benefits.  These cases
are usually children in foster care.  Foster care increased greatly during the 1980s.  The reasons are not completely
understood, but many people attribute at least part of the increase to the epidemic of crack cocaine use that occurred
in many big cities.52
perhaps not surprising that a model that relies on labor market variables and AFDC waivers,
many of which were aimed at encouraging labor market work, explains changes for two-parent
families well and changes for children hardly at all. Two-parent families respond to the business
cycle, but as discussed above, the labor force participation of single mother is fairly unresponsive
to the business cycle or to program variables.  Child-only cases would not be expected to
respond much to changes in the economy or to the kind of waivers that were implemented.
One important question for policy-makers is whether the effects of the macro-economy
and AFDC/TANF program parameters have changed over time. Blank (1997) shows separate
results for 1977-1985 and 1986-1995.  She finds that although some factors are bigger in one
time period than another, the model is basically robust to different time periods.  However,
Moffitt (1999) estimates a model using variation in state unemployment rates for 1977 to 1980
before the early 1980’s recession and recovery; 1981 to 1986, which includes a full business
cycle; and 1987 to 92 which covers a weak recession and recovery.  He finds that the cyclical
sensitivity of the AFDC caseload has risen over time.  In the first period a one-point increase in
the unemployment rate was associated with a 1.6 percent increase in AFDC caseloads.  In the
second period the same change was associated with a 2.3 percent increase in caseloads, and by
the third period it was associated with a 3.9 percent increase.
In an earlier study Moffitt (1987) tried to predict the increase in the AFDC participation
rate between 1967 and 1979.  His approach was to assess the effect of a set of measurable
economic and programs changes and to attribute the residual to social factors such as a change in
attitudes or unmeasured program changes, such as the court-ordered changes that eliminated the
main-in-the-house rule.  He used CPS data to predict the probability that a female head of
household will be on welfare using data from the 1967, 1973, and 1979 CPS.  For each woman
in each year he estimated the probability of participation from the state AFDC benefit level, the
benefit reduction rate, and the unemployment rate in the woman’s state; her education, age, race
and income from other sources; the number of children she had; and her region of residence. The
effects of these variables were in the expected direction: higher benefits and high unemployment
rates are associated with a greater probability of participation.  More highly educated women,
older women and women with alternative sources of income are less likely to participate.  But
three things stand out in these models.  First, little of the increase in caseloads over this period
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could be explained by the economic or demographic factors that affected participation rates.
Second, the statistical significance of most variables declined over time even though the sample
sizes increased.  Third, the intercept grew, meaning that there was a significant upward shift in
participation propensities between 1967 and 1973 unaccounted for by the variables in the model.
Moffitt concluded that the increase in participation was due both to program changes other than
changes in the benefit reduction rate and benefit levels and to a decline in stigma associated with
participation.
60
Bavier (1999) in a model discussed below also finds changes over time.  His model
predicts changes in the caseload between 1967 and 1993 fairly well, but it predicts a much
smaller decline in caseloads than the observed decline after 1993. The effect of the employment
rate on caseloads between 1993 and 1995 was similar to the effect in previous years.  But after
1995 caseloads declined faster than the pre-1995 coefficient predicted.
One problem with aggregate data like that used in all these studies is that it does not
permit analysis of sub-groups with different propensities for welfare use. One important
hypothesis about the recent welfare reforms is that in response to those reforms the most
advantaged welfare recipients will leave the rolls first leaving behind the most disadvantaged
families who will then be more difficult to get into the labor market.  An alternative hypothesis is
that the least advantaged welfare recipients are the least likely to be able to comply with work
requirements and are therefore the most likely to have left the rolls because they were sanctioned
or otherwise encouraged to leave the rolls.  Moffitt (1999) estimates the same model as the CEA
report.  But instead of predicting administrative counts of AFDC recipients he uses CPS data to
predict the proportion of female residents aged 16 to 54 years in a state who receive AFDC.  By
using individual data Moffitt can disaggregate the caseloads into age and education subgroups
for each state to see whether changes in welfare policy and economic conditions affect women
with different characteristics differently.
61 He finds that waivers had the greatest effect on
women with less than 12 years of schooling.  A waiver reduced AFDC participation in this group
by 1.7 percentage points. it also increased the work effort of this group more than others.  This
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supports the second hypothesis. But these women experienced no significant increase in earnings
or wages.
As I have noted not all these studies include a measure of AFDC benefit levels.  But
some do and they all find that an increase in benefit levels increases caseloads. For example, the
Lewin Group (1997) finds that a 10 percent increase in real AFDC benefits for a family of three
(from say $400 to $440) increases the AFDC basic caseload by 2.7 percent and the AFDC-UP
caseload by 2.6 percent.
All these studies find that economic conditions have played an important role in the
decline in caseloads since 1993.  For example, Wallace and Blank conclude that, “The on-going
decline in unemployment rates can explain about 8 to 19 percent of the AFDC caseloads since
1994… The expected effect of any future one-point increase in unemployment will be to increase
TANF caseloads by 4 to 6 percent …”  However the extent to which the economy explains the
decline seems to depend on how changes in caseloads are modeled.  All studies except Figlio and
Zilliak and Zilliak et al. find that waivers were an important predictor of the decline in caseloads
since 1993.  In most studies models that include program parameters and economic variables
explain the run-up in caseloads between 1988 and 1993 better than the decline since 1993.
C.2 Changes in Other Programs.  As discussed above changes to programs other than
AFDC could affect AFDC caseloads. There is surprisingly little research on the interactions
between programs.  For example, I know of no research to date that has tried to estimate the
effect of the growth in the EITC on welfare caseloads.  A growing research literature considers
the effect of the EITC on work and marriage, but just like the research on the effect of AFDC on
work and marriage it can tell us only a limited amount about the effect of the EITC on AFDC
caseloads.
62
The EITC has almost certainly increased labor market work of single mothers.  However,
the magnitude of the effect is unclear.  Research on the effect of the EITC largely relies on
descriptive evidence about changes in labor force participation among those who the EITC is
likely to affect and those it is unlikely to affect.  For example, most recipients of the EITC are
single mothers, so researchers compare the trend in work for single mothers to the trend for
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and Leibman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999a, 1999b) and Ellwood (1999).  For research on the effect of the
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married mothers or to the trend for childless single women (two groups largely unaffected by the
EITC).  Meyer and Rosenbaum find that weekly employment increased by almost six percentage
points for single mothers between 1984 and 1996, but declined nearly one point for single
women without children.
63  In addition work among single mothers increased more in states with
a low cost of living than states with a high cost of living.  Because a given dollar of EITC
transfer has more purchasing power in a low cost of living state, this can be taken as evidence
that the EITC encourages work.  Finally there is weak evidence that work among single mothers
increased more in states that have a state EITC than in states without a state EITC. How much
this increase in work by single mothers has affected welfare caseloads is unknown.  But it is
likely that the effect of the EITC, especially combined with the work requirements of TANF
have contributed substantially to the decline in AFDC/TANF caseloads since 1993.
On the other hand the EITC probably had little effect on marriage rates for women with
children. The EITC has complex potential effects on marriage.  Given the structure of the tax, the
EITC provides single mothers who do not work an incentive to marry someone who does work
(because the couple will qualify for the EITC).  If the tax compensates for the extra cost of a wife
and child the man also has an incentive to marry.  But single mothers who work can incur a
penalty when they marry someone who also works if the marriage increases family income
above the phase out range of the tax.  Ellwood (1999) concludes that there has been no
discernible increase in marriage or cohabitation among low-skilled women as a result of welfare
reform or changes in the EITC.
Several studies have found that access to Medicaid was an important determinant of
participation in AFDC.  Blank (1989) using 1980 data from the National Medical Care
Utilization and Expenditure Survey finds that health problems increase AFDC participation.
Since Medicaid is presumably more valuable to families in which a member has health problem,
this suggests that some families retain AFDC in order to retain Medicaid.  But neither the
Medically Needy program nor the state mean insurance value of Medicaid had significant effects
on AFDC participation.  This is consistent with Mauskopf et al. (1985) who also found little
effect of the Medically Needy Program on state AFDC caseloads.  Winkler (1991) finds similar
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results.  The Lewin Group (1997) also found only a small and statistically insignificant effect of
the Medicaid expansions during the 1980s on AFDC caseloads.  Nor did estimated changes in
the value of Medicaid benefits have an effect that was reliably different from zero.
Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) use 1984 and 1986 SIPP data to estimate the effect of expected
medical expenditures on AFDC participation.  They control several state characteristics
including the wage rates, the AFDC guarantee level, and food stamp guarantee level.  They also
control characteristics of individuals including the availability of private insurance, age, race,
education, health status, and family size and composition.  Expected Medicaid benefits are
calculated from the health status of family members.  They find that higher expected Medicaid
benefits are associated with increased AFDC participation.  Their results suggest that if all single
women got health insurance when they worked, AFDC caseloads would decline by 10.7 percent.
Thus when the insurance value of Medicaid is high (or put another way the health of recipients is
low) families will alter their behavior to keep Medicaid eligibility, which until recently implied
keeping AFDC eligibility. An important difference between Moffitt and Wolfe and Blank (1989)
and Winkler (1991) is that Moffitt and Wolfe use the insurance value of Medicaid estimated for
individual families while the other studies use state mean insurance values.
Yellowitz (1993) pooled individual-level data from the CPS for 1989 to 1992 to estimate
the effect of the increase in the availability of Medicaid on AFDC participation and work effort
of single mothers.   He argues that the changes in Medicaid amounted to changing the income
limit for eligibility.  He calculates the income limit for Medicaid as a percentage of the poverty
line.  He then calculates the gain in Medicaid accessibility for families by calculating the impact
of Medicaid expansion for individual children.  Some children were not affected by the
expansion either because they were too old to qualify for the change or because the child was
already covered.  For example, children in high AFDC benefit states gained less from the
Medicaid expansion because their income limit for AFDC was higher than in low benefit states.
He then estimates the effect of the gain in eligibility on AFDC participation.  He finds that
increasing the income limit for Medicaid resulted in a decrease in AFDC participation and an
increase in labor force participation among single women.  His estimates suggest that the fully
phased in expansions resulted in a 3.5 percent decline in AFDC caseloads.57
The Lewin Group (1997) found suggestive evidence that when eligibility rules for SSI
were tightened in 1977-78, AFDC caseloads increased in response.  But they caution that this
finding is not robust.
C.3 Effect of Demographic Characteristics.  Several studies consider the effect of the
proportion of state residents who are single mothers on welfare caseloads.  In Figure 11 single
parenthood is an endogenous demographic characteristic, and therefore partly caused by changes
in the economy, welfare program parameters, and other factors, so it may not be appropriate to
control rates of single motherhood in a reduced form estimate of the effect of these factors on
caseloads.  Nonetheless is useful to see how much the increase in single parenthood has affected
AFDC caseloads.
We expect that as the number of single mothers increases, AFDC caseloads would also
increase because it is a program that almost entirely serves single mothers. However, the story is
not likely to be so straightforward because the relationship between single motherhood and
welfare caseloads depends on both the number of single mothers and the participation rate of
single mothers.  While the former has increased steadily since the 1960s (and before) the latter
has fluctuated.  In 1970 28.9 percent of single mothers received welfare.  The proportion of
single mothers receiving welfare reached a high of 35.2 percent in 1976.  It then declined to 28.8
in 1980.  It remained at about this level until 1993 when it began to decline again. The percent of
single mothers receiving AFDC reached a low of 22.5 percent in 1996.
64  In addition, states vary
in the percent of single mothers receiving welfare.  Thus the correlation between the number of
single mothers and the size of AFDC caseloads is likely to be far from 1.
Gabe (1992) attributes two-thirds of the rise in AFDC caseloads between 1987 and 1991
to the growth in families headed by a never-married mother.  But he does not take into account
the effect of changes in labor market conditions or welfare rules, so his estimates are almost
surely exaggerated.  Bavier (1999) uses CPS data to try to understand the decline in AFDC
caseloads since 1993.  He shows that the number of persons living in families with children
declined by 37 percent between March 1993 and March 1998. But the number of persons in
female-headed families with children did not change.  Nor did the share of female heads in
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unrelated sub-families or the percent living with unrelated individuals.
65  Thus the decline in
AFDC caseloads could not be accounted for by a decline in single parent families.  Instead, as
noted above, the percent of such families receiving AFDC declined.
Blank (1997b) finds small and statistically insignificant effects of the change in the state
percent of families headed by females on changes in AFDC caseloads between 1977 and 1995.
The Lewin Group (1997) estimates that the decline in marriage and the increase in non-marital
births increased AFDC basic caseloads by .5 percentage points annually between 1980 and 1994,
which is about a quarter of the total average annual growth in caseloads.
Blank also estimates the effect of other demographic characteristics on AFDC-Basic
caseloads.  She finds little effect of the percent of state residents who are immigrants, recent
immigrants, black, Hispanic, or elderly on changes in caseloads, partly because these
demographic factors did not change much within states over her period of observation.  Blank
shows that about 45 percent of caseload fluctuations can be explained by changes in the number
of child-only cases and the number of such cases can in turn be explained by some demographic
factors.  Both the percent of the state population that is black and the percent that is recent
immigrants have large and statistically significant effects on the size of the child-only caseload.
Black children are much more likely than other children to be placed in foster care.  Children of
recent immigrants often qualify for AFDC benefits when their parents do not, and thus become
child-only cases.
The Lewin Group finds that legalization of illegal immigrants under the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) contributed to the growth in child-only AFDC
cases between 1988 and 1993.  Immigrants whose presence in the United States was legalized by
IRCA were not eligible for AFDC benefits for a five-year waiting period.  Their children who
were born in the United States had always been eligible, but many parents did not sign their
children up probably for fear of deportation.  Once they were legalized, they took advantage of
the AFDC program.
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seems to have increased (Bavier 1999).  From 1987 to 1991 CPS estimates of the number of families with children
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C.4  Norms and Values.  Few studies try to estimate the effect of changes in norms and
values on AFDC caseloads. Blank (1997b) and Wallace and Blank (1999) estimates the
importance of several political variables on caseloads including the political party identification
of the governor of the state and which political party controls the state House and Senate.  These
might be interpreted as having effects through norms and values because political parties with
more liberal attitudes towards welfare may create a political climate in which families feel like
they can ask for help and state civil servants see their job as helping recipients rather than
discouraging them from taking welfare. Of course, more liberal regimes may also implement
more liberal AFDC policies, but these studies try to control some of these.  They find that
Democratic governors and representatives are associated with higher caseloads and with a rise in
caseloads.
Moffitt (1983) in a well-known study used 1976 PSID data to estimate the effect of
welfare stigma on participation in AFDC. He reasons that there may be a “flat” component of
stigma that is associated with whether an eligible individual would participate at all, and a
“variable” component that is influenced by program parameters so that once people are on the
program, changes in program parameters affect their probability of participation.  For example,
some people may have such negative feelings about welfare that they would not accept it.  But
others may accept welfare under the right circumstances.  He finds that stigma affects the
decision to go on welfare, but he finds little evidence for a variable component of stigma.
Other research suggests that a person’s probability of participating in welfare is
influenced by the behavior of those with whom she interacts.  A substantial research literature
documents the intergenerational correlation of welfare use.
66  However, this correlation could
result from several factors.  First, poor children are more likely to grow up to be poor, so the
correlation could just result from shared economic circumstances.  It could also arise if families
who get welfare have less distaste for welfare (and perhaps more distaste for work).  Finally it
could arise if families who get welfare transmit information about getting welfare that lowers the
transaction costs of participating.  Gottschalk (1992) using NLSY data finds that among
individuals eligible for welfare, those who grew up in families that received welfare were more
likely to receive it themselves than those who grew up in families that did not receive welfare.
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This suggests that at least some of the intergenerational transmission of welfare use results from
either shared norms and values or shared information.
Bertrand et al (1999) use Census data on individuals for whom English is a second
language (and who therefore presumably mainly communicate in another language).  They test
the hypothesis that being surrounded by others who speak the same language increases welfare
use more for individuals from language groups with high welfare use than for individuals from
language groups with low welfare use.  The assumption is that individuals from language groups
with high welfare use will have less welfare stigma and/or more knowledge of welfare because
of these networks.  After estimating numerous models to overcome problems of selection bias,
their research seems to confirm the importance of networks in welfare participation. Their
estimates suggest that a policy change that increases welfare caseloads by 1 percent in the
absence of networks can be expected to result in an observed increase of between 15 and 25
percent.  Again it is difficult to sort out whether these apparent “contagion” or “contextual”
effects are the result of differential information or differential stigma.
D. Take-up Rates.
Caseloads can change because the number of people eligible for the program changes or
because the number of eligible people who actually participate in the program changes.
Caseloads are the outcome of factors that affect both eligibility and take-up rates.  Most of the
factors that I have discussed so far are likely mainly to affect the number of  people eligible for
AFDC.
Reasons for non-participation among eligible individuals and families can include lack of
information about the program, difficulties associated with joining the program or adhering to
program rules (such as transportation problems), or the stigma associated with program
participation.  Studies that try to estimate why some eligible individuals participate in programs
while others do not must try to determine who is eligible for programs from survey data.  There
are several problem with doing this.  First, surveys often do not include all the information that a
caseworker would use to determine eligibility.  Second, because there are so many differences in
eligibility rules across states and these change rapidly, researchers seldom can include all states-
specific eligibility criteria in all years.  Finally, income at the bottom of the income distribution
is often mis-reported, and it is likely that the quality of income data at the bottom of the61
distribution has declined over time.
67   All these measurement problems can cause
misclassification of the eligibility of individuals or families.
Blank (1997b) estimates the relative importance of changes in participation rates among
eligible families and changes in the number of eligible families to trends in the AFDC caseloads
using data on twelve states from the Current Population Surveys.  She finds that between 1984
and 1995 almost all the change in caseloads is attributable to changes in eligibility.  The
participation rate fell slightly over this period.  However, it rose during the 1990-91 recession
and fell afterwards.
E.  Welfare Dynamics.
The 1996 changes to welfare limit the length of time that a family can receive welfare
benefits.  In the AFDC program women could get welfare indefinitely as long as they remained
eligible.  Many policy makers as well as voters worried that single mothers had become
dependent on welfare.  Thus several studies tried to estimate how long recipients stayed on
welfare and what determined the length of welfare spells.
68  A welfare spell is generally defined
as a period of continuous welfare receipt from the time the case is opened.
We know from these studies that:
·  The average length of a welfare spell is less than two years. Among persons beginning a
spell of AFDC receipt 48 percent will be off welfare within two years and 14 percent
within four years.
·  Most current recipients are in the midst of a welfare spell that will last more than five
years.
·  Changes in marital status and employment are the most frequent events associated with
movement on and off of AFDC.
For example, Bane and Ellwood (1983) find that about 25 percent of welfare exits are due
to an increase in the female head’s earnings and about 30 percent are due to marriage.  Other
studies find that between 30 and 50 percent of exists are due to an increase in earnings.
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Administrative data on the length of a welfare spell for a sample of current AFDC
recipients show that the length of the median completed welfare spell increased from 23 months
in 1968 to 31 months in 1975,  then decreased such that by 1990 it was back to its 1968 level.
69
Gottschalk et al. (1994) use PSID data to estimate changes in the length of welfare spells
between 1974 and 1987.  They estimate the likelihood that a family who receives AFDC in a
year will also receive it in the next three years.  Because most current AFDC/TANF recipients
are long-term recipients, they estimate the change in the probability of being a long-term
recipient among those with a high probability of being a long-term recipient.  They find that the
probability of being a long-term welfare recipient increased for blacks from about 55 to 69
percent.  But the probability declined from 65 to 45 percent for non-black recipients.  This does
not suggest that over this period caseloads were significantly affected by changes in length of
welfare spells, since most welfare recipients are not black.
The kind of measure of spell length used in Gottschalk et al. and other studies has well-
known problems.  A measure of welfare receipt that samples current recipients then estimates the
length of their future stay on welfare (a censored sample) over-represents long-term recipients.
Thus the median length of spells from this “point-in-time” measure is longer than the median
length of spells for all recipients starting a spell and may yield misleading trends.  Hoynes and
MaCurdy (1993) used PSID data from 1968 to 1988 to estimate changes in the length of welfare
spells using an alternative measure of welfare spells that does not over-sample long-term
recipients.  A woman is counted as on welfare if she is a single head of a household with a child
who received welfare in the year. Using this measure they estimate hazard rate of leaving welfare
in year k given that a woman was on welfare after t years of uninterrupted receipt.  They find that
the percent of spells lasting less than two years increased from 45 to 59 percent between 1975
and 1980.  But the length of welfare spells increased between 1980 and 1988.  By 1985 the
percent of spells that would last less than two years was 51 percent.  In contrast using the same
data there was no trend in “point-in-time” estimates of spell length over this period.
Hoynes and MaCurdy also estimate the effect of demographic characteristics (age,
education, marital status, number and age of children), economic factors and program variables
(AFDC benefit level, wage rates, unemployment rate), and year splines to capture year trends on
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spell length. They find that the likelihood of leaving welfare for those in spells greater than four
years remained unchanged over the 1969-88 period.  Both falling welfare benefits and lower
unemployment rates reduce the length of shorter welfare spells. Demographic variables account
for little of the trend in welfare spell length.  Economic and program variables explain about half
the decline in spell length between the late 1960s and early 1980s with most of this attributable
to the decline in benefit levels. Neither benefit levels nor economic variables seem to explain the
lengthening of spells after 1988.  These results suggests that welfare recipients can roughly be
divided into those who respond to economic and program incentives and those who respond
slowly if at all.
Another way to look at welfare dynamics is to ask what is the total length of time that
families are on AFDCover multiple spells.  This is potentially important way to look at
dependency because many families go on and off welfare several times.  Using monthly SIPP
data that summed across multiple spells of welfare receipt, Pavetti (1995) estimates that taking
into accounted repeated spells new enrollees in the AFDC program could be expected to spend a
total of six years in the program.  For families on the AFDC rolls the average total length of time
on AFDC was thirteen years.  Women with little education, with little recent work experience,
who were never married and who have several children or young children have longer total time
on welfare.
The events associated with first taking welfare have changed somewhat over time
(Boisjoly et al. 1996).  Most importantly, the percent of first welfare spells that began because of
a reduction in work hours declined from an average of 27 percent between 1973 and 1982 to an
average of 24 percent between 1983 and  1991.  Fewer spells also began as the result of a first
birth to a never married woman (21 versus 27 percent).
F. Conclusions about AFDC Caseloads.
Taken together the studies on AFDC caseloads lead to the following conclusions:
1.  Estimates of the relative importance of the unemployment rate and changes in the
AFDC program are sensitive to how one models lags in unemployment and state
dependence in caseloads.  Because we do not have a strong theory about how these
lags should work, it is unclear how to model them.  The best single predictor of
AFDC caseloads in year t is their level in t-1.64
2.  Unemployment and other labor market conditions are important determinant of
caseload changes.  Most estimates suggest that a 1- point increase in the
unemployment rate would increase caseloads by 4 to 6 percent.
3.  Welfare program parameters are important predictors of welfare caseloads.  Higher
benefits increase caseloads.  But there is considerable debate about the effect of other
specific program parameters, such as work requirements.
4.  Although the increase in the number of single mothers is an important determinant of
AFDC caseloads, other demographic factors seem to have played a relatively minor
role in predicting trends in AFDC caseloads.
5.  Although the evidence is not yet strong, some studies suggest that contextual effects
may be important to welfare caseloads.  People who are around others who use
welfare are themselves more likely to use it net of their own eligibility for the
program.  It is unclear whether these effects are the result of better information or
reduced stigma.
6.  Models of caseload trends explain only a small fraction of the total variance in AFDC
caseloads and they appear to do a worse job for more recent years than for earlier
time periods.  But they do a better job of predicting AFDC-UP caseloads than
predicting AFDC-Basic caseloads, and they do not predict child caseloads at all.
IV.  Research on Trends in Food Stamp Caseloads.
Much less research has been done on caseloads in the FSP than on AFDC/TANF
caseloads.  The FSP is a national program with much less variation across states and fewer
potential disincentives (which is one reason it has more political appeal), so FSP caseloads are
harder to model econometrically and less theoretically interesting to academic researchers testing
economic or sociological theories.  Hence they have done less research on the FSP.  Most of the
research on food stamps has either been done by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
which administers the FSP, or by contract research firms commissioned by the USDA.  Much of
USDA’s interest in the program has been in whether the FSP alters food consumption and
nutrition, so a lot of the research has focused on those issues rather than caseload changes.
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USDA has published papers since 1988 in a series titled “Current Perspectives on Food
Stamp Program Participation” that provides information on food stamp caseloads and
                                                
70 The FSP was established at least in part as a way to promote the interests of farmers.  Increasing the food
purchasing power of the poor was supposed to increase food consumption nationwide, helping farmers stay in
business.   The FSP program is administered by USDA, not the Department of Health and Human Services, which
administers cash transfers.  USDA remains concerned with the agricultural industry and the nutritionalstatus of
Americans.  The economic status of the population is of secondary concern.65
participation.  I do not review all these studies individually, because much of it is descriptive and
many of the studies repeat the same analysis for different time periods. Instead I try to highlight
the main findings from this work.  I also discuss the few academic research papers that have been
done.
71  I organize this discussion in the same way that the discussion of AFDC caseloads was
organized.
Almost all AFDC/TANF recipients are eligible for food stamps, so one might expect the
food stamp caseload to move in tandem with the AFDC/TANF caseload.  But because over 60
percent of food stamp recipients do not receive AFDC/TANF, these trends could diverge and the
reasons for increases or decreases in the caseload may not be the same.
A.  Effect of the FSP on Labor Supply.
The most important potential disincentive effect of food stamps is on labor supply.
Because married couple and single individuals as well as single mothers can receive food
stamps, there is no marriage penalty.
Fraker and Moffitt (1988) model the effect of joint participation in food stamps and AFDC
on labor supply.  The budget constraint for individuals on both food stamps and AFDC is
complex and includes many kinks.  The formula for computing countable income to determine
food stamp eligibility and benefit levels is complex, and AFDC benefits are included in the food
stamp formula (but food stamps are not counted in the AFDC formula).   Thus, modeling the
labor supply effects of AFDC and food stamps jointly is not easy.  Fraker and Moffitt use
economic and demographic data from the fifth wave of the Panel of the Income Survey
Development Program (ISDP).  They estimate that in 1980 the FSP reduced labor supply of
female heads of families by about 9 percent.  But marginal changes in benefit levels and the
benefit reduction rates had only a minor effect on labor market participation.  Thus, the
additional work effort among single mothers that could be generated from changing the FSP is
likely to be small.
 Hagstrom (1996) uses data from the 1984 SIPP to model the effect of food stamp
participation on the labor supply of married couples.  The FSP is the largest means-tested
                                                
71 Relevant research papers in this series includes Doyle and Beebout 1988, Trippe and Beebout 1988, Allin and
Beebout 1989, Trippe 1989, Doyle 1990, Martini 1992, Trippe and Doyle 1992, Trippe, Doyle and Asher 1992,
Stavrianos and Nixon 1998, Gleason, Schochet and Moffitt 1998.66
assistance program available to married couples, and about a third of food stamp expenditures go
to such families.  Hagstrom finds that the FSP has a weak effect on the labor supply of married
couples.  Decreasing the maximum benefit by 25 percent reduces the labor supply of husbands
and wives by less than 1 percent.  But Hagstrom also finds that increasing food stamp benefits by
25 percent would raise participation in the FSP among married couples by 7 percent.  Because
the labor supply effect from raising benefits is small, some of the rise in the participation rate
must come from an increase in the take-up rate.  Reducing the benefit reduction rate from 30
percent to 10 percent would raise participation by 12.9 percent.
B. Research on Caseloads.
B.1 Economic Conditions and Program Parameters. Wallace and Blank (1999) use the
same data and models that they used to predict changes in AFDC caseloads to predict changes in
food stamp caseloads.  They find that food stamp caseloads are more responsive than AFDC
caseloads to unemployment rates. They estimate that a 1 percentage point rise in the
unemployment rate increases AFDC caseloads by 4 to 6 percent and the FSP caseloads by 6 to 7
percent. This is not surprising since a much larger proportion of the food stamp caseload is
married couples and single individuals whose work effort is responsive to the business cycle.
Most of the AFDC caseload is single mother families whose work effort responds much less to
the business cycle.  The FSP also appears to be more responsive than AFDC caseloads to the
state’s median wage.  Whereas the median wage had little effect on AFDC caseloads an increase
in the median wage reduces FSP caseloads.  Again, this is presumably due to the fact that the
food stamp caseload includes more married couples and single individuals.
A recent report by Trippe and Doyle (1998) used administrative data from the Food Stamp
Quality Control Records between 1994 (when the caseload peaked) to 1997 (the year after TANF
enacted changes to FSP eligibility) to describe changes in caseloads.  Table 8 shows some results
from their reports.  It shows that 61 percent of the decline in the FSP caseload resulted from a
decline in the number of families receiving welfare benefits, even though many families leaving
AFDC/TANF presumably retained eligibility for food stamps.  The number of legal immigrants
receiving benefits fell by 54 percent, no doubt mainly as a result of the change in their eligibility.
This reduced caseloads by 14 percent.  Participation by childless unemployed adults, whose
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eligibility was also changed by the new rules, fell precipitously. But because they were not a
large part of the food stamp caseload, this accounted for only 8 percent of the decline in
caseloads.  Thus the decline in the FSP caseloads since 1993 appears to result from changes in
factors affecting AFDC and changes in the parameters of the FSP.
This same study shows that participation in the FSP among native-born children of legal
immigrants (who remained eligible for food stamps after the 1996 program changes) declined
faster than the participation of children of non-immigrant parents (37 percent and 15 percent
respectively).  This suggests that restrictions on the eligibility of immigrant adults deterred
participation by their children.  Beginning in 1993 there was a surge in the number of legal
immigrants who became naturalized citizens. The number of naturalized citizens who
participated in the FSP increased by 66 percent.  About 20 percent of the apparent decline in
participation by immigrants was made up for by the fact that individuals switched from being
immigrants to being naturalized citizens.
The 1996 welfare reforms restricted eligibility for food stamps among childless able-
bodied adults to three months in any 36-month period unless they work, are exempt under other
provisions, or live in areas of high unemployment. Stavrianos and Nixon (1998) estimate that, as
expected, over time this will decrease the number of childless able-bodied adults who get food
stamps.  However, they also conclude that this will have a small effect on the overall food stamp
caseload.  In any month of 1996 3.8 percent of the food stamp caseload was subject to this work
requirement.  Of these only 4.7 percent were meeting the work requirement and could continue
to receive food stamps.  In principle the others (3.6 percent of the food stamp caseload) were
accumulating a month towards their three-month time limit. But USDA projects that up to half of
these cases will qualify for an exemption from the work requirement. The net result will be a
small impact on the food stamp caseload.
B.2  Interactions with Other Programs. Wallace and Blank find an unexpected effect
on the FSP caseloads of factors that in principle effect AFDC but not FSP eligibility.  For
example the implementation of AFDC waivers appears to reduce FSP caseloads even though
none of the waivers directly affected eligibility for the FSP.  There are two main explanations for
this relationship, namely information and stigma.  States that implemented AFDC waivers may
have projected a “get tough” attitude towards welfare recipients thus raising the stigma
associated with all welfare programs.  As discussed above Wallace and Blank also found that68
state Democratic Party leadership increased both AFDC and FSP caseloads.  Since the FSP is a
national program, state legislators cannot change program rules so any effect of political
leadership is likely to be due to a political climate that is more or less sympathetic to welfare
recipients.
Another possible explanation for the tighter-than-expected relationship between
AFDC/TANF and the FSP is that historically eligibility for the two was determined at the same
time.  When families lose their AFDC eligibility they may think that they also lose eligibility for
the FSP.  But the new welfare rules seem to have also dissuaded some people from even trying to
get welfare.  This may be because they do not think that they are not eligible, because they do
not want to go to work, or because they do not want to use up their 60-month eligibility.  These
families not only will not get TANF, they will not get information about food stamps, Medicaid
or other programs that they may be eligible for.
The converse of this joint decline in program caseloads is that the expansion of the
Medicaid program between 1988 and 1990 appears to have increased the number of women and
children who participated in the FSP (McConnell 1991).  None of the Medicaid expansions
increased eligibility for food stamps, but they did increase the participation rate for mothers and
their children presumably because the outreach efforts for Medicaid also provided potential
recipients information about food stamps and other welfare programs.  McConnell estimates that
about 25 percent of the increase in food stamp participation between 1989 and 1990 can be
explained by the expansion of Medicaid.
Gunderson et al. (1998) use aggregate-level national data between 1972 and 1996 to
estimate the effect of the poverty rate, the unemployment rate, and the inflation rate on the
percent of the population receiving food stamps (the participation rate).  They estimate that a one
percentage point increase in the inflation rate results in a .126 percentage point increase in the
FSP participation rate.  Food stamp benefits are tied to inflation so in principle inflation leaves
the real value of benefits unchanged, and thus it should not affect caseloads.  But AFDC benefits
are not tied to inflation and states did not increase benefits, so inflation eroded the real value of
AFDC benefits.  As the real value of AFDC benefits decline, the FSP participation rate increases
for the same reason that lower income people are more likely to participate, namely the marginal
value of a dollar of benefits is higher.  Gunderson et al. also estimate that a one-percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate increases the FSP participation rate by .301 percentage points.69
A dummy variable for the post-1990 period is large and statistically significant suggesting that a
large part of the change in the participation rate after 1990 is unexplained by these characteristics
of the macro-economy.
B.3 Demographic Characteristics.  A considerable amount of evidence documents the
demographic composition of FSP caseloads.  But little research tries to assess the effect of
demographic factors on trends in caseloads. Wallace and Blank (1999) find that food stamp
caseloads are more responsive than AFDC caseloads to the demographic composition of states.
The percent of state residents who are black, female heads of families, and the percent of non-
marital births all increase FSP caseloads but not AFDC caseloads. Years of education and the
percent of the population who are elderly reduce FSP caseloads but not AFDC caseloads.
B.4 Norms and Values.  As already discussed, Wallace and Blank (1999) find that as
with AFDC, Democratic political leadership in states tends to increase food stamp participation
while Republican leadership in states tends to decrease it.
C. Take-up Rates.   
By far most of the research on food stamp caseloads has been on the take-up rate.
Participation rates among eligible individuals and households is lower in the FSP than in other
means-tested programs, presumably because food stamps must be used in public and therefore
carry more stigma.
Trippe et al. (1992) review research on food stamp take-up rates.  They note that existing
estimates for participation rates in the FSP vary by as much as 30 percent for any given year and
unit of analysis.  For example, estimates of the take-up rate among individuals range from 38
percent to 69 percent.
 The discrepancy in the estimated take-up rates is partly due to differences in the data
used for the estimates, especially in whether the study gets data on caseloads from administrative
data or survey data.  Studies that use administrative data generally find higher take-up rates than
those that use household survey data.  For example, the average participation rate for four studies
using administrative data is 58.3 percent. The average for four studies with estimates over
roughly the same time period using household survey data is 39.3 percent.  Participation rates are
the ratio of the number of eligible individuals or household (the numerator) to the number of
participating individuals or households (the denominator).  In all studies eligibility must be70
estimated from survey questions.  But administrative data provide the actual number of program
participants while surveys provide an estimate.  The actual number of participants is generally
higher than the number estimated from surveys data.  Thus studies using only survey data
generate lower take-up rates.
 Among household surveys the quality of the data needed to estimate eligibility varies
considerably.  Over a dozen different surveys have been used for this purpose.  The Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CES) provides consistently low estimates of participation: two studies
using these data estimate a household participation rate of 24 percent (West 1984) and 28 percent
(Brown 1988).  This is probably because the CES income measures are measured with a lot of
error (Mayer and Jencks 1993).  Probably the best survey data for estimating eligibility is the
SIPP, which was begun in 1984.
A few studies have tried to predict changes over time in the take-up rate of the FSP.
Trippe (1989) estimates that the take-up rate increased from 43 to 65 percent between 1978 and
1981 due to program changes, mainly the abolition of the requirement that food stamps be
purchased .  The take-up rate dropped slightly in 1982 for unexplained reasons then remained
steady between 1982 and 1988.  In a follow-up study, Trippe et al. (1992) use administrative data
on the number of persons and households receiving benefits and the amount of food stamp
benefits and data on personal characteristics of recipients from a caseload sample. To estimate
the size of the eligible population they uses CPS data.  They repeated these estimates using SIPP
data for years after 1984.  They find that the participation rate for individuals increased from
32.3 percent in 1976 to 39.5 percent in 1978 and to 56.4 percent in 1980.  Again they attribute
much of this increase to the program change eliminating the purchase requirement for food
stamp coupons.
Trippe et al. (1992) also find that persons eligible for higher benefits participate at higher
rates than persons eligible for lower benefits.  This is consistent with other studies of the FSP and
with studies of AFDC.  It is also consistent with economic theory that predicts as transaction
costs decline relative to the program benefit more people will participate.  However persons who
are eligible for the maximum benefit, who are therefore the poorest survey respondents,71
participate at below average rates. This is also found in other studies and is probably due to mis-
measurement of income in the lowest income groups.
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There are important demographic differences in participation rates. In 1990 the
participation rate for households with children under 18 years was 67.9 percent while the
participation rate for households without children was only 36.9 percent.  This is probably
because households with children are more likely to get AFDC and AFDC recipients
automatically qualify for food stamps. Trippe et al. (1992) and most other studies find that
participation rates for the elderly are fairly low.  Ponza and Wray (1990) give three reasons: 1)
the elderly eligibles often believe that they do not need food stamps, 2) they prefer to rely on
other sources for food, and 3) they do not know they are eligible.  While participation rates differ
across demographic groups, trends in participation rates have been similar for all demographic
groups.  Thus while changes in household characteristics could contribute to changes in
caseloads, changes in the participation rates of households with different characteristics probably
did affect caseload trends.
Blank and Ruggles (1996) use 1986 and 1987 SIPP data to estimate the determinants of
participation in the FSP (and AFDC) among eligible single mothers.  They try to predict whether
a single mother participates in food stamps in a month that she is eligible.  In other words they
use the panel structure of the SIPP to create a data set of months of single parenthood and then
they determine whether each “case” (a month of single motherhood) was eligible for benefits,
experimenting with several estimates of eligibility.  They find that single mothers often do not
receive food stamps in months in which they are eligible.  On the other hand, most mothers who
go on food stamps do so immediately when they are eligible. Most of the spells of eligibility that
do not result in women taking up the program are very short. Non-participants had lower
expected benefits than participants and shorter spells of eligibility.  They were also less
disadvantaged on many parameters – they were less likely to be disabled, they had fewer
children and more education than mothers who participate when they are eligible.  This suggests
that they were less needy. Taken together these results suggest that women who fall on hard
times and anticipate that the situation is temporary do not want to incur the high transaction costs
                                                
72 Jencks and Mayer (1997) and Mayer and Jencks (1989) show that the material living standards of the extremely
poor are often higher than those with higher incomes.  They take this as evidence that income is badly measured for
those in lowest 10 percent of the measured income distribution.72
(and possibly stigma) of getting benefits.  This is especially true when the potential gains are
relatively small.
D.  Program Dynamics.
Studies in the USDA series find that most people who begin receiving food stamps
receive them for a relatively short period (Gleason et al. 1998).  In the 1990 and 1991 SIPP half
of all persons who began receiving benefits quit receiving them within nine months.  But
research also shows that at any particular point in time most food stamp recipients are in the
midst of a long spell of food stamp receipt.  Among the food stamp caseload in a given month
between 1990 and 1991, three-quarters of the recipients were in the middle of a spell of at least
two years and 60 percent were in a spell of at least five years.
Re-entering the food stamp program is common.  For example, more than half of those
who stop receiving food stamps re-enter the program within two years (Gleason et al. 1998).
High re-entry rates imply that food stamp recipients are highly dependent on food stamps over
time.  Among recipients who received food stamps any time between 1990 and 1991 a third
received them for all 32 months of the panel and only a little over a third received them for a
total period that was less than twelve months.  The median total time on food stamps was twenty
months (Gleason et al. 1998).
The length of spells increased significantly between the mid-1980s and early 1990s.  Half
of all persons who began receiving benefits in the mid-1980s were off within six months.  In the
early 1990s it took nine months for half the people who began receiving benefits to quit getting
them (Trippe and Doyle 1998).  Neither entry nor re-entry rates changed over this period
meaning that the longer spells accounted for much of the increase in caseloads over this period.
Not surprisingly, household income is the most important determinant of how dependent
the household is on food stamps.  Households with some labor income when they come on the
rolls and households with more income exit quicker and have fewer re-entries than households in
which no one works and with incomes below the poverty line (Gleason et al. 1998).
For able-bodied adults without children higher unemployment rates and falling wages in
the state’s manufacturing sector are associated with longer spells of food stamp receipt even with
the household’s own income controlled.  Because eligibility does not change if income does not73
change, this suggests that as the economy in a state worsens the stigma associated with getting
benefits declines or the information about the benefits is more readily available.
For other groups, including the elderly and families with children, labor market
conditions had a small and statistically insignificant effect on length of food stamp spells.
Female-headed families with children remain on food stamps longer than other kinds of families,
and families with children under age six have especially long spells.
E. Conclusions about the FSP Caseloads
Research on food stamps suggests the following tentative conclusions:
1.  Economic variables predict FSP caseloads better than they predict AFDC/TANF
caseloads, partly because economic variables have a greater effect on the
participation decisions of married parents and single individuals than on single
parents.
2.  Food stamp caseloads respond to changes in food stamp program parameters, but they
also respond to changes in other programs, especially AFDC/TANF and Medicaid.
3.  A large part of the increase in FSP caseloads in the mid-1980s and early 1990s was
due to an increase in the length of food stamp spells.  A large part of the decline in
the late 1990s is due to changes in the FSP and in other welfare programs that
decreased the take-up rate for food stamps.
V. Research on Trends in the SSI Caseload
Social scientists have not done as much research on SSI as they have done on AFDC.
SSI recipients are either seriously disabled or elderly and therefore not expected to work.  Thus
there has been little controversy over disincentives provided by the program.  As with food
stamps much of the interest in SSI has been in trying to explain why so many of the people who
are eligible for benefits do not receive them.  Research on SSI is also hampered by the fact that
few data sets include enough information on respondents’ heath status to accurately estimate
whether a non-elderly person is eligible.  Thus nearly all the research is on take-up rates among
the elderly.
Researchers have also tried to understand the increase in child SSI cases, but because this
seems so closely tied to the Supreme Court decision in Sullivan v. Zebley, this too has not74
provoked much academic research.  Recently the potential incentive for parents to claim that
their healthy children are disabled has become a focus of some research.
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A. Take-Up Rates.
Research on the take-up rates of the elderly encounters many of the same methodological
issues that arise in estimating food stamp take-up rates, namely that survey data do not include
sufficient information to accurately determine whether respondents are eligible for SSI.  But
available estimates suggest that the proportion of the eligible elderly who participate in SSI has
always been fairly low.  Estimates range from 54.6 percent using CPS data (Sheil et al. 1990) in
the federal SSI program (with lower participation rates for state programs), to 61 percent with the
superior SIPP data.
The proportion of the elderly who get SSI benefits has declined over time.  This is partly
because the income of the elderly has increased.  However, rising incomes cannot entirely
account for the decline in participation among the elderly because the proportion of the elderly
who are poor and getting SSI has also declined.
Warlick (1982) reviewed very early research on SSI participation rates, which found that
elderly persons eligible for SSI did not participate because they lacked information about the
program, because they did not believe they needed the money, or because they preferred to get
help some where other than the government.  Warlick then used 1975 CPS data to estimate the
determinants of SSI participation among the elderly eligible population.  She was interested in
the effect of information, stigma, bureaucratic complexities, and benefit levels.  Although
measuring expected benefit levels is relatively straightforward, measuring the other variables is
not.  She included a variety of variables to tap information and stigma including respondents’
age, education, marital status and region of residence and whether their state automatically
conferred Medicaid eligibility on SSI recipients.
She found that the participation rate among home owners increased from 41.2 percent to
55.7 percent when the expected benefit level doubled from about half the median to the median
benefit.  She also found that education was negatively related to participation.  This suggests that
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They used various models to simulate caseloads.  I do not review these here because they mainly amount to attempts
to apply the eligibility rules to survey data.  Menafee et al. (1981) discusses some of this early work.75
lack of information may not be an important factor in take-up rates. But stigma may be positively
associated with education and this could explain its negative effect.  Residing in a rural area was
positively related to participation.  If participation depended on transaction cost this would be
unexpected.  Living in a state that automatically confers Medicaid eligibility also did not
increase participation.  The latter two finds do not suggest that transaction costs are a large
deterrent to SSI participation.  However, Warlick uses only federal eligibility standards in
determining SSI eligibility and benefit levels, which could introduce considerable biases is her
estimates
In 1974 the Social Security Administration conducted the Survey of Low-Income Aged
and Disabled to assess the impact of SSI on potential participants. Menefee et al (1981) analyzed
these data in a attempt to understand the relatively low participation rate among those eligible for
SSI.   They found that among the elderly who are eligible for SSI non-participation is related to
better health, lower predicted benefits, non-metropolitan resident, stable income, unwillingness
to accept public aid, and lack of knowledge about available services. These results are therefore
broadly consistent with Warlick (1982).
Coe (1985) used data from the 1979 PSID.  Of the 187 elderly individuals estimated to be
eligible for SSI benefits, 52.2 percent actually received benefits.  Of those not receiving benefits
36.2 percent said they either did not know about the program or did not know about eligibility
rules and therefore did not think they were eligible. Another 37.4 percent knew about the
program but did not think they were eligible and 26.4 percent thought they were eligible but still
did not participate.  Coe also estimated a model of participation similar to Warlick’s model and
found similar results.
It is hard to know how to interpret these measures of knowledge of the SSI program.
Potential recipients inclined to take SSI benefits might be more likely to seek out program
information and to pay attention to information that is available.  So lack of knowledge about the
program may partly indicate lack of interest.  This suggests that information campaigns might
not be as successful at increasing take-up rates as these finding on lack of information suggest.
McGarry (1996) used the 1984 panel of SIPP to estimate the determinants of
participation in SSI among elderly individuals and couples eligible for the program.  As
predictors she included potential benefits, availability of a car, living in a city, years of
schooling, age, and health status.  Like other researchers she found that a higher expected benefit76
is the main determinant of participation in SSI.  In addition, even after controlling the size of the
expected benefit, individuals with assets or who reported some labor income are less likely to
participate. Many factors expected to reduce the cost of getting benefits (such as owning a car,
living in a city, and having more education) were weakly or even negatively related to
participating.  McGarry interprets this to mean that the transaction costs of participation are less
important than other researchers have suggested.
McGarry also tried to account for measurement error in her estimate of potential SSI
benefits.  This is an important issue because most data sets do not have sufficient information to
accurately calculate the SSI benefit one would receive.  Errors in measuring potential benefits
can create the standard errors-in-variables problem, which could result in a downwardly biased
estimate of the effect of benefit levels and bias in the estimated effect of variables correlated with
the benefit level.  Because benefit levels are also used to estimate eligibility, errors in benefits
could cause errors in the classification system. McGarry uses a two-stage procedure to create an
instrument for the potential benefit.
74  She finds that when she ignores mis-measurement of
benefits, a 25 percent increase in benefits is associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase in the
probability of participating.  When she takes measurement error into account the increase is 6.1
percent.  McGarry concludes that elderly people eligible for SSI mainly respond to the economic
incentives of the program and that information, costs of participating and stigma are likely to be
less important than suggested by earlier research.
Sheils et al. (1990) use CPS data to estimate trends in the SSI participation rate among
eligible people over 65 years of age.  The take-up rate increased from 54 to 61 percent between
1975 and 1978.  The rate then declined to about 56 percent in 1987.  They attribute the latter
decline to a decrease in the number of elderly eligible for the maximum benefit due to an
increase in income from other sources.
B. Changes in the Definition of Disability.   
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uses state-specific eligibility data to increase the accuracy of her predicted benefit levels.  She estimate benefits both
for those who actually receive them and for those who did not.  When she compares her predicted benefit level to
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In 1996 21 percent of SSI recipients were aged. The remainder was eligible due to
disability.  So changes in disability can have a large effect on SSI caseloads.  The most important
change in the definition of disability was the change in how children’s disability is assessed.
By far the largest category of disability for the SSI program is mental illness.  In 1996
among 18 to 64 year olds 30.4 percent of recipients had a mental disorder and 28.4 percent were
mentally retarded.  The next largest category is “nervous system and sense organs,” which
includes most people eligible due to blindness. In 1996 10.1 percent of recipients had this
diagnosis.
75  In 1992 (the latest year for which I could find data) 58 percent of children were
eligible due to a mental disorder and most of these (44 percent) were mentally retarded.  The
only other major category of disability for children is blindness.  Because some mental illness is
difficult to diagnose the definition of mental illness has changed over time, which could in turn
lead to changes in the SSI caseload.  However, I was unable to find any information on trends in
diagnosed mental disorders.
The number of children who receive SSI more than doubled between 1989 and 1992
(from 300,000 to 770,500).  A study by the United States General Accounting Office tried to
determine why child caseloads grew so much.  It compared children admitted to the SSI
caseloads two years before and two years after the medical listings were expanded and new
procedures for assessing disability among children were implemented in response to the 1990
Supreme Court ruling in Sullivan v. Zebley.
As part of its decision the Supreme Court ordered that children denied SSI benefits from
1980 on should receive a new review using the new rules for determining eligibility developed in
the decision.  The GAO (1995) found that the new procedures added 87,900 children to the rolls,
about 19.6 percent of the increase.
76  GAO found that the increase in the diagnosis of mental
impairments including mental retardation and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder accounted
for more than two-thirds of the growth in SSI caseloads among children.
    In 1985 AIDS was added as a condition for “presumptive disability.”  This meant that
people could get SSI benefits for up to six months while a determination of disability was being
made.  In 1991 HIV was added as a category for presumptive disability.  However, HIV and
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AIDS have added few cases to the SSI rolls partly because treatments for the disease have
lessened its severity and partly because few people have the disease.
In 1996 Congress passed legislation that removed drug and alcohol abuse as disabling
conditions for the purpose of SSI eligibility.  In January 1997, recipients classified as drug
addicts or alcoholics were no longer eligible for SSI.  In June 1996 there were 119,000 SSI
recipients whose disability was based on drug or alcohol abuse.  But the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that up to 75 percent of them would be eligible for SSI based on another
disabling condition.  Because there were 6.5 million SSI recipients in 1996, the impact of the
change on caseloads due to the change in policy on drug and alcohol abuse was no doubt trivial.
C. Conclusions about Research on SSI Caseloads
We can draw the following conclusions from the research on SSI caseloads:
1.  Take-up rates for the SSI program are low.  The highest estimates suggest that only
around 60 percent of the elderly who are eligible participate in the program.
2.  The main determinant of participation among elderly eligibles is the size of the
potential benefit.
3.  The increase in the number of children participating in SSI is mainly due to the
expansion in eligibility due to changes in how disability among children was
determined.
4.  Other changes in the definition of qualifying disabilities probably had trivial effects
on changes in the SSI caseload.
VI. Conclusions
The research in this Report makes it clear that no one factor is explains caseload trends
either for a particular program or for social welfare programs in general.  This Report outlined
four exogenous factors likely to affect caseloads: macroeconomic conditions, exogenous
demographic characteristics, program parameters, and norms and values.  Evidence suggests that
no single factor consistently explains the observed trends in AFDC, SSI or FSP caseloads, but all
of them may explain at least some of the observed caseload changes. The main substantive
conclusions that apply to all programs from the research reviewed in this Report are:
1.  All else equal, when programs are generous more people participate in the program.
The largest single determinant of whether an eligible person takes-up a program is the
size of the expected benefit.79
2.  All else equal, when unemployment is low fewer people participate in welfare
programs.
3.  Neither economic variables, nor program variables, nor the combination explains
much of the change over time in caseloads or state differences in caseloads and the
predictive power of models of caseloads seem to explain less of the variance in
caseloads over time.
4.  The take-up rate among those eligible for a program is an important determinant of
caseloads.
5.  Program interactions are important.  Changes in Program A that result in a change in
caseloads of Program A can also affect the caseloads in Program B even when the
change to Program A has no direct effect on eligibility for Program B.
  Different factors seem to have affected programs differently.  This is partly because the
programs themselves differ.  For example, macroeconomic conditions will have a much smaller
effect on caseloads of programs whose participants are not sensitive to business cycle
fluctuations, such as the elderly and single mothers, than on programs whose participants are
non-elderly men.  Programs targeted at specific demographic groups will be more sensitive than
other programs to changes in the size of that demographic group.
Following are conclusions about such differences.
1.  The trend in AFDC caseloads is due to combinations of macro-economic changes,
demographic changes including the increase in single motherhood, and program
parameters, especially benefit levels.  Different factors seem to have affected
caseloads at different historical periods.
2.  The trend in the SSI caseloads is largely due to the increase in the income of the
elderly, which reduced their use of SSI, and the change in the criteria by which
children were judged to be eligible.
3.  The FSP caseload is affected by the unemployment rate and other program
parameters.  The FSP caseload seems to be especially influenced by AFDC/TANF
program parameters because receipt of FSP benefits has been closely tied to receipt of
cash welfare benefits.
However, this research is subject to some potentially serious limitations.  The next
section discusses some of those limitations.  The following section discusses some guidance for
social welfare policies that follow from this research80
A. Methodological Issues.
This research raises several important methodological issues. Many of these problems
arise because social scientists have not developed strong theories about what factors should
affect caseloads and in what way.  Although the theory of welfare participation among
individuals is fairly well-developed, theory about how state-level factors affect caseloads is less
well developed.  This leads to three related potential sources of bias.
·  Most empirical models of caseloads are either reduced-form, and therefore do not allow
us to understand the causal mechanisms through which variables work, or they include a
few intervening variables that are poorly measured.
·  None of these studies does a good job of creating a dynamic model that takes into
account the possibility that caseloads and program parameters may be jointly determined
and reach different equilibrium under different circumstances.
·  Most research fails to adequately address possible contagion or contextual affects of
welfare receipt.
I will discuss each of these then turn to two other methodological issues, namely the
problem of weak measures of predictor variables and the importance of choosing the right
dependent variable.
A1.  Limitations of Reduced-form Models.   Reduced-form models do not try to specify
the mechanisms through which exogenous variables affect an outcome.  For many purposes this
appropriate or at least sufficient.  If one wants to know the net effect of a policy change on
caseloads, a properly specified reduced form model provides the answer. However,
misunderstanding the mechanism whereby effects occur can lead to serious problems in
interpreting the meaning of such results, especially for policy purposes.  Imagine that a program
change predicts a decline in caseloads.  The decline could be the result of more people getting a
job and therefore becoming ineligible, or it could be the result of fewer eligible people
participating in the program.  In the former case well-being might improve while in the latter it
might deteriorate.  Thus the reduced form model provides little guidance to policy-makers who
want to improve well-being.
A few of the studies in this Review have included measures that might be partly
endogenous. But the measures are often poorly conceptualized or poorly measured.  For81
example, Blank (1997b) and Wallace and Blank (1999) include the percentage of state residents
who are female heads with little rationale about why they do so.  Several studies of SSI take-up
rates include measures intended to tap how much individuals know about the SSI program, but
these are generally weak measures of such knowledge, such as educational attainment. Some
studies include variables for state political leadership but it is unclear whether these are supposed
to be exogenous or endogenous and their meaning is ambiguous. No paper explicitly tries to
estimate a causal model of caseloads.
A2. Dynamic Models.  A second and related problem resulting from weak theory is that
we have little guidance about modeling lags in exogenous predictors of caseloads.  For example,
we have little guidance about whether a change in unemployment should simultaneously increase
caseloads or increase them with some lag.  Because families may have some savings, because
they are likely to call on friends and family for help before they turn to the government, and
because getting information about government programs takes time, some lag seems likely.  But
the length of the lag is unknown.
This research also provides little guidance about possible feed-back effects between
exogenous factors.  A change in the economy that increases welfare use might then affect
welfare program parameters.  Consequently these models cannot tell us about the likely
equilibrium caseload level or what might change that equilibrium.
Evidence suggests that models that predicted caseloads in the 1970s well do not do as
good job at predicting caseloads in the 1980s or 1990s. Few models include all four exogenous
“causes” of caseloads shown in Figure 11 and the studies that do try to include them all are
plagued by measurement error and omitted variable bias.  Over time if unmeasured or poorly
measured factors become more important in determining caseloads, the predictive power of the
model will decline.  It is nearly inevitable that this will occur, because current models tend to be
based on what seems important today, especially when they are not guided by a strong theory.
Currently in the United States policy analysts are very interested in the relative importance of the
economy and program changes on TANF caseloads and very uninterested in changes in social
norms and values.  Models of caseloads therefore included the former variables and ignored the
later.   However, it is likely that the welfare changes of 1996 greatly changed the attitudes
towards welfare among potential and actual welfare recipients and the public.  These unmeasured82
changes could account for why models predict post-TANF caseloads worse than pre-TANF
caseloads.
Models of caseloads can also lose predictive power over time if the composition of the
caseloads changes.  Imagine that at time 1 all AFDC recipients are single mothers.  Program
parameters might be very important relative to labor market conditions in predicting caseloads
because the labor market participation of single mothers is relatively unresponsive to labor
market conditions.  If a program or social change increases the number of married couples
receiving the benefit, labor market conditions are likely to become more important for predicting
caseloads.  If on the other hand children are the main recipients, labor market factors will be
even less important. 
A.3  Contextual Effects and the Possibility of Multipliers.  The models of caseloads
used in almost all this research are aggregate versions of the individual-level model of welfare
participation and are loosely based on the economic theory of welfare program participation.
Thus rather than an individual’s own employment probability the models include the state
unemployment rate and rather than a woman’s own marital status it includes the percent of state
residents who are single mothers.  None of the research explicitly takes into account the potential
importance of “contextual effects” or “contagion effects” on welfare use although what evidence
that we do have suggests that such effects might be important and result in multiplier effects of
policy or other changes.
To understand how “contagion” might operate imagine a state in which unemployment
rises.  More people become unemployed so more will be eligible for food stamps.  But other
things may happen as well.  Some of the newly unemployed people never will have gotten public
assistance.  When they get it they tell their friends about it.  As more people get food stamps the
stigma associated with getting the benefit declines and the availability of information about how
to get on the program increases. Public sympathy for the unemployed may also increase,
reducing the stigma associated with using food stamps.  Caseworkers too might be more
sympathetic and treat applicants more kindly.  When unemployment returns to its old level a
greater aggregate propensity to get benefits remains for some period.  In addition the greater
aggregate propensity to get benefits may delay the decline in unemployment in the same way
that generous unemployment benefits extend periods of unemployment.83
A.4 Weak and Omitted Predictors.  I have already mentioned several problems arising
from omitted variables. A few others deserve mention.  The economic theory of program
participation takes program rules as exogenous.  Research in the United States uses state
differences in welfare program parameters to identify models of caseloads.  But we have no
strong theory about why programs differ across states.  For example, it is now well-established
that individuals respond to the size of the potential welfare benefit. But the size of the welfare
benefit may depend on a culture in the state that both increases benefits and creates an inviting
atmosphere for potential welfare recipients.  Omitting measures of the implementation practices
that create the inviting atmosphere could lead us to over-state the importance of the benefit level.
Research using fixed-effects overcomes some of these problems by estimating the effect
of changes in program variables and other factors on changes in caseloads.  But of course this
leads to the problem of why states differentially change their programs.  If the factors that are
associated with state’s changing the program also affect the caseloads directly, the results can be
misleading.
None of the research reviewed here does a good job of measuring transaction costs.
However, it is likely that transaction costs are correlated with other program parameters and may
be correlated with economic conditions and norms and values.  When unemployment rises and
demand for welfare increases, lines at welfare offices might increase and case workers might
become over-worked and irritable.  Both could increase transaction costs. Welfare administrators
might even respond to an increase in demand for welfare by reducing the hours that welfare
offices are open, reducing the number of case workers and doing other things that raise
transaction costs in an effort to hold down increases in caseloads. I was able to locate no research
on the effect of implementation policies on welfare participation or caseloads.  For example, I
could find no study of the effect of proximity to welfare offices or wait times in welfare offices
on participation.
Researchers are turning some attention to implementation issues because of ad hoc
evidence that they are important.  For example, in a study of the effect of recent policy changes
on work effort among single mothers, Ellwood (1999) devised a measure of changes in the
“aggressiveness” of welfare caseworkers.  He reasoned that if a person with income of Y could
get welfare in State A but not State B, caseworkers in State B were more aggressive in
preventing welfare use.  If in State A this person would have gotten benefits at t but not at t+1,84
the state has gotten more aggressive.  Ellwood finds that this measure of caseworker
aggressiveness is positively related to single parents’ work effort.
A. 5 The Dependent Variable. Almost all this research treats welfare receipt as a simple
dichotomy – either people get it or they do not.  But many of the same factors that affect whether
people get welfare affect how much they get.  How much welfare people get might be a better
predictor of welfare costs than how many people get it.  When women combine welfare and
work, they remain a part of the welfare caseload but they consume fewer welfare dollars.
One important lesson from this research is that if one wants to know about caseloads, one
should estimate models of caseloads rather than models of things correlated with caseloads.  A
large amount of research tries to predict labor market work and marriage from welfare program
parameters.  This is useful for understanding the incentives of welfare programs, but it is much
less useful for predicting the size of caseloads.  On the other hand, if one is interested in welfare
costs, one should estimate these directly since caseload size is only one determinant of welfare
expenditures.
B.  Policy Implications.
B.1  Benefit Levels.  This research confirms that all else equal when welfare benefits are
high and easy to get participation among eligibles is high.  When benefits are low and hard to get
participation is low.
B.2 Program Interactions.  Changes in program parameters have the greatest impact
when their basic intent is consistent with that of other programs. When programs work together
they are more likely to have behavioral consequences than when they have incentives for
opposing behaviors.  The EITC alone seems to have had an important work incentive but
combined with TANF rules making work all but mandatory its effect on work effort seems to
have been very large.
When program changes are further tied to economic, demographic and social factors that
converge in encouraging the same set of behaviors the effect can be immense.  This appears to be
what has happened since 1996.  An unusually strong economy coincided with several policy
changes all intended to get single mothers off welfare. The changes that reduced the link between
Medicaid and AFDC made it possible for more women to work without giving up health
insurance at the same time that TANF made work a requirement and the EITC provided greater85
subsidies for low wages.  All this happened at the same time that a strong social consensus
supported the notion that single mothers should work in the labor market to support their
children.
The converse of these synergies is that when program rules are inconsistent with social
norms or economic conditions they can be thwarted.  In the early 1970s few case workers
seemed inclined to implement sanctions against mothers who did not work both because few jobs
were available and because there was still ambiguity about whether mothers of young children
should work.  Consequently, few welfare recipients were involved in work activities and few
were sanctioned for not doing so.
Program interactions can cause unintended consequences when their incentive structures
are in opposition. The strong connection between Medicaid and AFDC prior to 1990 seemed to
have resulted in a greater work disincentive than either program alone and the recent changes
implementing TANF seem to have unexpectedly reduced the take-up rate in other programs
because of the joint determination of eligibility. 
B.3  Large versus Small Policy Changes.  Although it seems obvious, policy makers
often seem to ignore one implication of the research in this review and others, namely that large
changes in programs have greater effects on recipients than small changes.  By a large change I
mean one that either affects many potential or actual recipients or one that greatly changes the
incentive structure of a program.
Changes to the SSI program that included HIV and AIDS and removed drug and alcohol
addiction as allowable disabilities had little effect on caseloads because few potential or actual
recipients had these disabilities.  But changes in the way disability was defined for children made
a big difference because a lot of children had qualifying disabilities.
Small changes in incentives cannot be expected to have large behavioral changes.  Many
things besides welfare parameters affect individual’s decisions about work, marriage, or
childbearing.  So it should come as no surprise that a marginal change in a welfare program does
not have a large effect on these decisions. During the late 1970s and early 1980s Congress and
the President “tinkered” with welfare program parameters, wrapping small changes in big
rhetoric.  For example, for all its emphasis on work effort the Family Support Act in fact
encouraged only modest changes the training or work experience of welfare recipients (or in
anything else about how states actually implemented welfare).  The result was relatively minor86
changes in caseloads attributable to the program changes. In contrast the evidence that we
currently have suggests that the 1996 changes, which essentially dissolved AFDC, appear to
have had larger effects on caseloads.
Large effects should not be confused with cost-effectiveness.  Research suggests that
small amounts of help in searching for a job are cost-effective in getting welfare recipients into
the labor market.  But the overall effect of such programs on women’s earnings and welfare
receipt are very small.  These programs are cost effective mainly because they are very cheap,
not because they result in large changes.
B.4  Differential Effects of Incentives.  Doubtless people respond to program
incentives.  However the extent to which they respond depends on their own characteristics.
Research on take-up rates of SSI, the FSP, and AFDC/TANF consistently show that the most
disadvantaged households are the most likely to participate in programs.  This is consistent with
economic theory because the marginal gain from participation is greater for the most
disadvantaged.  Labor market conditions have the greatest effect on people for whom labor
market work is a viable alternative to welfare.  People who are seriously disabled, who have
young children and no child care options, or who have very low labor market skills are unlikely
to respond to changes in the labor market because there is no realistic labor market conditions
that would make work possible. TANF allows states to exempt 20 percent of a base caseload
from work requirements in recognition of the likelihood that not all recipients will be able to earn
a living in the private labor market.  It is too early to tell whether this is close to the right
number.
The most advantaged respondents are not only able to take advantage of improvements in
the economy, they are also the most likely to have alternatives when changes in welfare rules
reduce the well-being of welfare recipients. When benefits decline the least advantaged still have
no alternative income source.  Not all welfare recipients are the same and program changes that
help the most advantaged recipients might hurt the least advantaged. To put this argument
another way, what works to get the first half of welfare recipients into work may not work for the
next half.
 It is clear that program parameters affect caseloads and therefore that policy-makers can
regulate the size of the welfare population.  After all if one abolishes a program the caseload
goes to zero.  But all rich countries have some program to help the poor.  This is because the87
citizens of such countries care not only about program caseloads and their costs but also about
the well-being of the poor.  Falling caseloads do not imply greater well-being.  Given constant
program parameters falling caseloads probably imply greater well-being because people leave
the program rolls when their well-being is greater off the program than on it.  When the program
parameters change people still leave the program when this improves their well-being.  But those
who leave may still be worse off than they would have been before the changes.
As Table 3 showed, a single mother who earned $10,000 in 1997 was better off than she
would have been in 1986.  But she may not be better off than a woman who did not work ten
years ago.  In Pennsylvania, a fairly representative state, in 1992 a single mother with two
children and no earnings would have had an income from combined AFDC and food stamp
benefits of $8,547.
77  All this would have been “disposable” income because she would not have
to pay taxes, childcare, or other work expenses. And she would get to spend more time with her
children or in leisure.  This is clearly greater than the $6,924 that a mother earning $10,000
would have had in disposable income in 1997.  Thus working women are better off than they
would have been ten years ago but non-working women are worse off than they would have been
ten years ago and worse off than they would have been as non-working women ten years ago.
Whether women and children as a whole are better off now than ten years ago depends on the
value of work itself (apart from the earnings it generates).
When a program has time limits it is almost certain that people expelled from the
program will be worse off, at least in the short run, than they would have been if allowed to stay
on the program.  Consequently, time limits can improve social well-being in only two
circumstances.  Social well-being will improve if the tax savings or alternative uses of money
improves the well-being of those who do not participate in the program enough to off-set the
decline in well-being for those who participated in the program.  Social well-being will also
improve if the short-term declines in well-being from the program changes are off-set by long-
term increases in well-being for those who participate in the program.  For example, if TANF
recipients are financially worse off for a couple of years but the work experience that they gain
by being forced to work improves their long-term well-being they will be better off in the long
run.
                                                
77 U.S. House of Representatives, 1992, page 628.88
Although evidence about the determinates of caseloads is accumulating, there is much
less evidence about whether the caseload changes are accompanied by rising or falling well-
being. If we are interested in the well-being of the poor, we need to study that directly.89
Appendix 1
Description of Data Sets
Following is a brief description of the most commonly used data sets in the studies reviewed in
this Report.
Current Population Survey (CPS).  The CPS is on an on-going survey begun in the 1940s
administered by the US Census Bureau.  It has a rotating design in which households are in the
sample for four months, out of the sample for eight months and in again for four months.  The
sample in any month is about 60,000 households.  The sample includes the U.S. civilian non-
institutionalized population.  The annual March Supplement, which includes extensive
information on labor market participation in the last year and a job history, also includes military
living in civilian housing and an over-sample of 2,500 housing units with an adult of Hispanic
origin. The CPS has been redesigned on several occasions so researchers must take care to assure
comparability of data over long time periods.
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).  The CEX is sponsored by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and conducted as an on-going survey by the Census Bureau.  Data in all the studies in
this Report come from the Interview Survey, which includes about 5,000 households who are
interviewed at three-month intervals for five quarters.  There are monthly rotation groups, so
each month 20 percent of the sample is new and 20 percent is completing its fifth quarter. The
sample includes the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population including military living in
civilian housing.  The reporting unit is the “consumer unit” defined as a single person living
alone or sharing a household with others but financially independent from them, a family (all
persons in the same housing unit related by blood, marriage, or adoption), or unrelated
individuals sharing major expenses. Household response rates have been about 85 percent since
1980.  The CEX has been conducted since the early 1960s but it has only been an on-going
survey since 1980.  Data from 1980 on are often not comparable with earlier data.
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID is a continuing panel study of a cohort of
families first interviewed in 1968.  The survey is sponsored by and conducted by the University90
of Michigan Survey Research Center.  Since 1983 the National Science Foundation has been the
principle funder of the PSID.  The sample has three components: 1) the 2,900 families chosen to
be representative of the non-institutionalized U.S. population in 1968 2) an over-sample of 1,900
low-income families with heads under the age of sixty also selected in 1968, 3) 2,000 Hispanic
families added in 1990.  The current sample includes all original sample members and the
subsequent families of their members for about 9,000 families and the individuals in them.
Current response rates are high, although attrition from the original sample was high.  The PSID
includes extensive information on family members including data on education, labor market
experience, marriage, fertility, geographic mobility and other things.  It also includes special
supplements on topical issues.
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  SIPP is a continuing panel survey
begun in 1983 that is sponsored and conducted by the Census Bureau.  The design is a rotating
panel with a new panel of households introduced each February and interviewed every four
months for forty-eight months.  The sample includes the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized
population and members of the military living in civilian housing.  The sample has varied from
12,500 to 23,000 households per panel.  The survey includes extensive information on monthly
participation in government programs, monthly labor market participation, and family and
individual demographic characteristics.References
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paper, University of Oregon at Eugene.Table 1  A Guide to Income in the United States in 1996
Unit Amount
Income and Earnings
    Median Household Income
a $35,492
     Median Annual Earnings of
     Individuals
b
$25,768
    Median Weekly Earnings of
    Individuals
c
$490
   Federal Minimum
   Wage/Hour $4.75
Poverty
    Poverty Line, Family of 3
d $12,273
    Poverty Line, Family of 4
d $16,183
    Official Poverty Rate
e 13.7 percent
        Child Poverty Rate 20.5 percent





a. U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical Income Tables,” Household Table H-5. Amounts include all
cash income before taxes.
b. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, Table 672.  Earnings are
for workers with earnings.
b. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, Table 671. Earnings are
for full-time wage and salary workers.
c. U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, page 1301
d. U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, page 1303
Notes: Earnings are for full-time, year-around workers.Table 2  Major Social Welfare Programs in the United States




Social Security Income support for the elderly






Cash transfers for involuntarily

















Continued on next pageTable 2, continued









Medicare Health Insurance for the elderly
















Economic support for schools with








Continued on next page.Table 2, continued




Poverty  (1970 –
1976)




Section 8 Housing Subsidized rent in the private
housing market for low-income
families
see above





a. U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, pg. 1356.
b. U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, pg. 996.
c. U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, pg. 1357.
d. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998, Table 291.
e. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998, Table 236.
Notes: “Major” programs are those that spent over $3.5 billion in 1996 dollars in at least one year since enactment.  The possible
exception is worker’s compensation, which paid $2.3 billion in benefits in 1997, but paid a total of $4.3 billion in combined benefits
and medical expenses in 1993.  I could not find more recent data on the combined expenditure and have therefore omitted this



















1986 -894 -5,924 -2,000 746 179 2,107 79% No
coverage
1997 -765 -4,967 -2,000 3,656 1,000 6,924 31% Children <
15
covered
Source: Ellwood 1999, Table 3.Table 4  Composition of Families with Children under Age Eighteen, Selected Years










Headed by a Never
Married Woman
1970 29.6 3.4 11.5 7.3
1980 32.2 6.2 19.4 17.1
1985 33.4 7.7 23.1 28.5
1990 34.7 8.4 24.2 33.0
1992 35.4 9.0 25.5 36.4
1996 37.1 9.9 26.7 37.4









1970 7,429 4.1 8.8 58.5
1971 9,556 4.9 10.5 69.2
1972 10,632 5.1 11.2 75.5
1973 11,038 5.1 11.3 80.5
1974 10,845 5.0 11.3 75.7
1975 11,067 5.2 11.8 71.6
1980 10,597 4.7 11.5 63.2
1985 10,813 4.5 11.2 54.4
1987 11,065 4.5 11.4 56.4
1988 10,920 4.4 11.5 58.8
1990 11,460 4.5 11.9 59.0
1991 12,595 4.9 12.9 60.0
1993 14,144 5.5 14.8 NA
1995 13,619 5.2 14.2 NA
1996 12,649 4.8 13.3 NA
* In thousands, NA means not available.
Source: House Ways and Means Committee 1998, Table 7-2 and 7-10.  House Ways and Means








1960 87.7 9.1 3.2
1970 85.2 11.9 2.9
1980 76.7 19.7 3.7
1990 72.5 24.7 2.8
1996 68.0 27.9 4.1




















































Same as above Same as above NA UR: 6% over
three years
-7.2

























Same as CEA Same as CEA,
with more detail
on waivers




































































































































Notes: UR = average annual unemployment ratesTable 8 Change in the Food Stamp Program Caseload





Legal Immigrants 54 14
Childless Unemployed Adults -44 8
AFDC Recipients -28 61
All other Participants -8 17
Total -22 100
Source: Trippe and Doyle (1998), Table 1.Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, Table 578


































































































































































































Average Monthly Benefit Per Recipient
Average Monthly Benefit Per Family
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Parameters
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